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The objective of this thesis is to demonstrate a method of relating doctrine to
requirements when considering space concepts. Service members must evaluate
solicited and unsolicited proposals from contractors, consider the advantages of space,
and then relate the advantages of space to the overall context of the proposed space
system working within current and future military organizations. To perform these
tradeoffs requires a strong foundation in how the services plan to operate in the next
conflict; the AirLand Battle and Maritime Strategy provide this strong foundation and
will be examined. The Army's Concept Based Requirements System (CBRS) relates
doctrine to requirements; it will be described as a recommended method for
determining joint requirements. To illustrate how CBRS will operate when considering




B. THE CURRENT CLIMATE FOR TACTICAL SPACE
SYSTEMS--A WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY 10
C. OBJECTIVE 13
D. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 13
E. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 14
II. METHOD FOR DETERMINING REQUIREMENTS 15
A. WHY STUDY DOCTRINE? 15




C. OTHER METHODS OF ANALYSIS 26
D. SUMMARY 31
III. - AIRLAND BATTLE AND THE MARITIME STRATEGY:
THE FOUNDATION FOR JOINT OPERATIONS 32
A. GENERAL 32
B. EXPLANATION OF TERMINOLOGY 33
C. AIRLAND BATTLE : 36
1. Introduction 36
2. The Basics 39
3. The Methods and Resources of Conducting Deep
Operations 46
D. MARITIME STRATEGY 54
1. Introduction 54
2. The Basics 56
3. The Methods and Resources of Conducting Over-the-
Horizon Operations 60
E. COMPARISON 64
1. The Basics 65
2. Methods and Resources 66
F. SUMMARY 69
IV. AN EXAMPLE OF THE CBRS PROCESS 70
A. INTRODUCTION 70
1. A Command and Control View of the Laser Designator
Function 70
2. Why a Space-Based Laser Designator 70
3. Organization of this Chapter 71
B. MISSION 72
1. Military Space Missions 72
2. Joint Doctrine on Laser Designation of Targets 74
C. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 77
1
.
Space Related Treaties 77
2. Space-Based Power 79
D. THREAT 80
E. TECHNOLOGICAL FORECAST 81
1. Environmental 82
2. Power : 82
3. Pointing Accuracy 85
4. Spot Size 85
5. Timeliness 88
F. SUMMARY 88
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 92
A. CONCLUSIONS 92
1. Conclusions From Chapter I 92
2. Conclusions from Chapter II 92
3. Conclusions from Chapter III 92
4. Conclusions from Chapter IV 93
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 93
LIST OF REFERENCES 95




Battlefield Mission Areas 17
2.2 The Concepts Based Requirements System (CBRS) 19
2.3 Battlefield Mission Taxonomy 20
2.4 Acquisition Requirements Definition Process . . . . : TV. . 27
2.5 Comparison of Requirements Definition Process and CBRS 28
2.6 Modular Command and Control Evaluation Structure (MCES) 29
2.7 Comparison Between MCES and CBRS 30
3. Unified and Specified Commands 37
3.2 Spectrum of Conflict-Army 37
3.3 AirLand Battle Basics 38
3.4 Command and Control for J-SAK 48
3.5 Targeting Process for J-SAK 50
3.6 Army and Air Force Platforms and Munitions , ... 53
3.7 Maritime Strategy Basics 56
3.8 The Spectrum of Conflict-Navy 57
3.9 The Engagement Process for ASUW 61
3.10 -Navy and Marine Corps Platforms and Munitions 63
3. 1
1
Command and Control (C2) Model 67
3.12 Comparison of C2 Model and the Engagement Processes 68
4.1 CBRS Areas to be Covered in this Chapter 72
4.2 Military Space Roles and Missions 73
4.3 Requirements for Using Laser Systems 75
4.4 Geometry of Engagement 76
4.5 Summary of Space Treaties 77
4.6 Power Supply Operating Regimes 80
4.7 Atmospheric Transmission for the Electromagnetic Spectrum 83
4.8 Electromagnetic Spectrum for Self-Guided Munitions 83
4.9 Seasonal Worldwide Average Daytime Cloudiness 84
4.10 Synergisms Among Space Laser Applications 86
4.11 Spot Size for a Space-Based Laser Designator 87
4.12 Altitude vs. Mirror Diameters for a Space-Based Laser 87
4.13 Maximum Time of Satellite Visibility 89
4.14 Vehicles Required for Hourly Worldwide Coverage 89
4.15 Limitations on Mission Duration and Orbital Altitude 90
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to briefly thank my two advisors, Allen Fuhs and Carl Jones. Dr.
Fuhs graciously agreed to be my advisor even with his diverse responsibilities as
President of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA),
Chairman of the Space Systems Group, and duties as professor at the_ Naval
Postgraduate School competing for his time. He also allowed me the opportunity to
study an area that I wanted to study, when many professors would only accept thesis
students for their own projects. Dr. Jones, the future Chairman of the Joint
Command, Control, and Communications (C3) curriculum, helped me transfer the
ideas from my old C3 study program to the Space Systems Operations degree field. He
helped me recognize the difference between facts and opinions and guided my research
when Dr. Fuhs was unavailable.
My thanks also go to my wife, Sandy. She had to tolerate my mood changes
which reflected my progress (or lack thereof) at various stages of the thesis. She did so




The Advisory Group for Aerospace Research and Development (AGARD), an
organization of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), held a symposium at
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) Langley Research
Center In 1983 ; the title of the conference was Space System Applications to Tactical
Operations. In his keynote presentation General Craig, the Air Force's Deputy Chief
of Staff for Requirements, observed the following:
From a tactical standpoint the most challenging aspect of seeing a new frontier
develop is to ensure space information and services remains compatible with
existing frontiers. That is what we have had to learn to do successively as we
moved from land - to the sea - and into the air in the past. Similarly, it is critical
that we as nations of the alliance stand shoulder-to-shoulder -- so that our forces
can INTEROPERATE effectively in the future just as we have worked hard to
have them do that today. ... A new frontier does not mean there is more money
available, it just means there is more competition for programs in the budget.
The measure of merit must remain one of determining the contribution expected
of new systems. [Ref. 1: p.4-3]
It is the purpose of this thesis to follow General Craig's guidance. By analyzing
joint service doctrine, new ways of performing common missions will be examined.
The common missions that will be examined in detail are those of long range
engagements--a generic term used to describe the Army's deep battle, the Air Force's
interdiction, and the Navy's over the horizon missions. From that basis, space support
to those areas will be reviewed. To illustrate a method for analyzing new space
applications, the idea of a space-based laser to designate targets will be explored.
Concept exploration requires people to look at traditional methods of performing
missions and then project how a new idea might fit in. There must be a way of
separating "good" ideas from "bad" ideas. "Good" may be low cost, high performance,
or a combination of these which tries to establish the value of the idea. Multi-
Attribute Utility Theory (MAUT) and other weighting schemes of these goals seek to
assist decision makers in this process. The weighting really depends on the orientation
of the decision maker who has the authority to pass judgement on the concept,
assuming there is only one decision maker.
It is the purpose of this thesis to illustrate a method for relating doctrine to
requirements. The method is illustrated by an example; the example is a space-based
laser designator. No attempt is made to trade the idea of a space-based laser
designator with others which would accomplish the same mission. An unbiased
analysis allows determination by the decision maker of the contribution expected of
new systems as they relate to traditional methods of performing that mission.
B. THE CURRENT CLIMATE FOR TACTICAL SPACE SYSTEMS-A
WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY
One of the forgotten dimensions in the military procurement process is historical
and political timing. An idea whose time has not come will not be funded. Windows
of opportunity sometimes open which will allow superior concepts the chance of
fruition; they also allow substandard concepts to be thrust forward without adequate
examination. It is essential that concepts be well-defined and articulated before
windows of opportunity open.
The services currently use space assets to enhance their ability to perform their
individual missions. Space is a very expensive place to operate [Ref. 2: p. 7], and the
military must be attuned to the historical and political windows of opportunity that
may open the way for other superior concepts to surface. Space support of joint
tactical operations is one area where the author believes the window may be opening
more widely. The following facts help to illustrate this statement.
Military space systems currently deployed appear to be designed to support
strategic- operations. The bulk of these missions are assigned to the Navy and Air
Force since they support the nation's nuclear TRIAD (Bombers, Submarines,
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles). A committee of the Army Science Board examined
the Army's utilization of space in 1984 and concluded that the Army was only a minor
user of available space systems with limited influence in the design and operation of the
systems [Ref. 3]. This was concluded even though the Army currently participates in
the Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities (TENCAP) program and has done so
actively for the past decade. As a result, an Army Space Initiatives Study (ASIS) was
undertaken, and an Army Space Policy was established by the Army's Secretary and
Chief of Staff in June 1985. The policy states:
Consistent with National and Department of Defense policies and in cooperation
with other Services and agencies, the Department of the Army will exploit space
activities that contribute to the successful execution of Army missions. The
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Army supports assured access to space and will use space capabilities to enhance
the accomplishment of strategic, operational, and tactical missions.
. . . Army plans and evolving space architecture must capitalize on national and
joint programs, preserving options to support initiatives that fulfill Army
requirements. [Ref. 4]
The Army's emphasis in the space policy on joint operations and the inclusion of
the tactical dimension to the employment of space systems found its way into the new
Department of Defense Space Policy. After the space shuttle Challenger accident and
the White House decision to restrict shuttle launches [Ref. 5], the old 1982 space policy
was in need of revision. A working group including the Air Force, Navy, Army, Joint
Chiefs of Staff, and Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) organization completed a draft
of the revision in December of 1986. Army and iMarine Corps interest in satellite
imagery of the local and regional tactical situation influenced the call for an expansion
of capability in the areas of space-based intelligence and surveillance. A key theme
throughout the draft policy was how U.S. military space systems were becoming a
more integrated part of U.S. military operations. The Army and Marine Corps insisted
that their needs for tactical support were integrated into the new policy. [Ref. 6]
While the Defense Department was examining its future role in space, the Senate
was examining its own role and that of the Defense Department organization to meet
national defense objectives. Under the leadership of Senators Barry Goldwater and
Sam Nunn, the Senate Armed Services Committee published a report entitled Defense
Organization: The Need for Change on 16 October 1985. The principal organizational
goal of DoD is defmed in the report as:
. . . the integration of the distinct military capabilities of the four Services to
prepare for and conduct effective unified operations in fulfilling major U.S.
military missions. In this study, this goal is termed "mission integration".
. . . Effective mission integration is critical to U.S. national security because
none of the major missions of DoD can be executed alone by forces of any single
Service. [Ref. 7: p.2]
The study further sites deficiencies caused by limited mission integration at DoD's
policymaking level. Some of the deficiencies, quoted from the report, include:
• In colloquial terms, materiel inputs, not mission outputs, are emphasized.
• A sharp focus on missions, where DoD must compete with potential
adversaries, is lost in the functional diffusion.
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• Functions (e.g., airlift, sealift, close air support) which are not central to a
Service's own definition of its missions tend to be neglected.
• Tradeoffs between programs of different Services that can both contribute to a
particular mission are seldom made.
• Opportunities for non-traditional contributions to missions (e.g., Air Force
contributions to sea control) are neither easily identified nor pursued.
[Ref. 7: p. 3]
The Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (known as the Nichols-
Goldwater Act) was approved by the committee on 6 March 1986. Two major features
of the act provides for:
• The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to assess joint military requirements
for acquisition programs and develop joint doctrine. [Ref. 8: p.3]
• The Congress to reduce the burden of congressional micro-management on the
Defense Department and reinforce the DOD organizational changes in the bill
by shifting the focus of Congressional oversight away from resource inputs to
mission outputs and from Service-unique programs to joint missions and
programs. [Ref. 8: p. 8]
The elections in 1986 shifted control of the Senate to the Democrats and
propelled Senator Nunn to the chairmanship of the Armed Services committee. In
implementing the new focus directed by the reorganization act, he announced proposed
changes in the subcommittee structure. His restructuring plan involved elimination of
the military construction panel and creation of a new panel to oversee Tactical Warfare
issues. The Sea Power and Force Projection subcommittee will be renamed the
Projection Forces and Regional Defense subcommittee under the plan. Chaired by
Senator Edward Kennedy, the panel will concentrate on areas where the United States
does not have substantial forces deployed and must depend on sea control and
maritime force projection when military might is needed. The panel also will have
responsibility for reviewing requirements of low-intensity conflicts where special
operating forces are needed. The changes would shift the emphasis of four of the
committee's six panels from a functional orientation involving budget review to a
mission orientation with a broader look at what the military needs to meet threats and
commitments. [Ref. 9: p.6]
The medium of space provides the Armed Forces with several advantages that
transcend service boundaries. It appears to the author that the historical and political
events of 1985 and 1986 may have opened the window for consideration of space
systems which are designed to support joint tactical operations. The recent decisions
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to form a J7 for doctrine and a J8 for acquisition within the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)
recognizes the need for emphasis in these two areas [Ref. 10]. It may also indicate that
much work needs to be done to defme exactly what is the joint doctrine for performing
missions and how that relates to the requirements for systems which will support that
doctrine. Because of the expensive nature of space systems, the services can no longer
expect to rely solely on internal service support for meeting their own space needs.
The key to winning approval of Congressional funding for space systems in the future
will be the articulation of joint military requirements and showing the relationship of
these requirements to the accomplishment of unified missions during the Planning,
Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) cycle.
C. OBJECTIVE
The objective of this thesis is to demonstrate a method of relating doctrine to
requirements when considering space concepts. Service members charged with the
responsibility to provide doctrine, training, organizations, and materiel for defending
the country must act as "honest brokers"; they must evaluate solicited and unsolicited
proposals from contractors, consider the advantages of space, and then relate the
advantages of space to the overall context of the proposed space system working
within current and future military organizations. To perform these tradeoffs requires a
strong foundation in how the services plan to operate in the next conflict. Doctrine
provides this strong foundation and will be examined to provide a frame of reference.
There currently exists a method within the Army to relate doctrine to requirements-it
is called the Concepts Based Requirements System (CBRS). It will be described as a
recommended method for determining joint requirements. To illustrate how CBRS will
operate when considering joint space requirements, a space-based laser to designate
ground targets will be examined.
D. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS
The "umbrella" statements of the services' doctrine are, by design, very broad.
The basic features of these concepts will be covered. However, the scope of this thesis
will narrow to the portions of these concepts dealing with deep operations and the
Joint Attack of the Second Echelon (Army and Air Force) and Over-the-Horizon
operations (Navy and Marine Corps).
In an effort to promote general understanding and discussion of the ideas of
tactical space support, the thesis is unclassified. As a result, some areas may appear
imprecise; this is a result of this self-imposed limitation.
13.
The audience for the thesis are not those already familiar with space systems and
their missions. It is intended to generally acquaint civilians and military people in
service doctrine and space applications. Every effort has been made to keep the
discussion brief enough to encourage reading instead of stacking this document.
E. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY
The Methodfor Determining Requirements chapter will discuss the reason doctrine
should be studied in the first place and will examine the Concepts Based Requirements
Systenr-(CBRS). CBRS relies on having a doctrinal base to provide the context for
considering solutions to deficiencies. AirLand Battle and the Maritime Strategy—The
Foundation for Joint Operations provides the context in the following chapter. The
focus will then narrow in this chapter to long range engagements as they apply to the
Army and Air Force's deep operations and the Navy and Marine Corps' over-the-
horizon operations. Comparisons will be made of the basic tenets, methods, and
resources of the services' doctrine on performing these operations to highlight joint
ideas. From this context, An Example of the CBRS Process will be presented in the
next chapter. The sections of this chapter will parallel four elements of the CBRS
process and will demonstrate the use of the method on a space-related problem. The
example chosen is a space-based laser to designate ground targets for attack. The
Conclusions and Recommendations chapter will highlight the key points presented
throughout the thesis.
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II. METHOD FOR DETERMINING REQUIREMENTS
A. WHY STUDY DOCTRINE?
The doctrine of the services might be called a form of "codified wisdom". 1 The
principles of war and other varieties of guidance for employing military forces are not
proven scientifically. The scientific method provides for identifying a problem,
formulating hypotheses to correct the problem, and designing experiments to Test the
possible solutions. It is certainly not desirable to start a conflict to establish whether a
principle of warfare is valid or invalid. The establishment of a bedrock foundation on
which to base employment and acquisition decisions is, therefore, difficult to prove.
The services do study historical precedents, form models to think about
operations, and attempt to formulate principles which transcend environmental
considerations. The attempts to do these functions can be labeled in a number of
ways: strategy, doctrine, tactics, etc. These labels are important and their meanings
will be explored later. The common element, however, is the attempt to articulate a
foundation upon which to build forces capable of defending the country. The definition
of a foundation is an important endeavor so long as wars continue to be fought. It's
the starting place for placing in context how the war will be fought to achieve political
objectives, how missions will be accomplished, and the interaction of forces which will
fight it— It provides the basis to answer the challenge issued by Senator Barry
Goldwater, then-Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, in a speech to the
Senate on 4 October 1985:
. . . The right problem is the integration of our forces to accomplish missions
and the right question is how to do it [Ref. 11: p.25].
This chapter explores the link between doctrine and the integration of new
systems. The Army's Concept Based Requirements System (CBRS) will be explained
in detail. The importance of understanding different service terminology will be
emphasized. Two recently examined methods for analyzing service requirements and
Command and Control (C2) systems will be compared with the CBRS.
^his term borrowed from Professor Carl Jones, Professor at the Naval
Postgraduate School.
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B. THE CONCEPTS BASED REQUIREMENTS SYSTEM (CBRS)
1. History
The idea of a mission approach to resource allocation goes back at least to the
Congressional Budget Act of 1974. The act stipulates that the President's budget be
displayed in terms of agency missions. Later, the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) promulgated Circular Number A- 109 (5 April 1976) requiring that any
proposed new major system acquisition be preceded by an analysis of the mission and
the formulation of a mission needs statement. In turn, the Office of the Secretary of
Defense (OSD) published a series of directives, 5000.1 and 5000.2 being among the
most important, to meet this requirement; the research and development community,
under the leadership of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering
(USRDE), also formulated a mission structure (a listing of missions) to meet this
requirement. The Army's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) was then
tasked by the Department of the Army headquarters to conduct Mission Area
Analyses (MAAs) for the Army in response to the same OMB requirement. It is from
this historical background that the process known as CBRS has evolved.
[Ref. 12: pp. 1-2]
The MAA process is a detailed application of the Concept Based
Requirements System (CBRS) process. The MAA focuses on Army battlefield
missions in determining deficiencies . and corrective actions for the purpose of
influencing resource allocation. The fundamental logic of MAA investigates the
required: battlefield tasks, their frequency of occurrence, the conditions under which
they must be performed, and the standards which constitute acceptable task
accomplishment. The different MAA battlefield mission areas are indicated in Figure
2.1 [Ref. 12: p. C-2] and are derived from a "capstone" concept of how the Army
intends to fight. The responsible organization for performing each of the MAAs is
called a proponent. [Ref. 12: pp.C2-C6]
A study was performed by two students at the Industrial College of the Armed
Forces to examine the Army's method of determining its requirements. The study was
requested by the Program Analysis and Evaluation office of the Office of the Secretary
of Defense. [Ref. 13: pp.1-2] The study concluded:
• The CBRS process results in detailed documentation which can be widely
































Figure 2.1 Battlefield Mission Areas.
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• The process can be used to substantiate specific requirements if they are called
into question during the extensive review process leading to DSARC (Defense
Systems Acquisition Review Council) I/II.
• The other armed forces should evaluate the Army requirements determination
process to determine whether it would improve their processes and whether the
improvement would justify the commitment of additional resources.
[Ref. 13:pp.49-50]
These results might not seem as significant if the study had been performed by Army
officers. The students who performed the analysis, however, were a Navy Captain and
Marine-Corps Lieutenant Colonel with extensive experience in materiel. acquisition for
their respective services [Ref. 13: p.2]. The following section is a description of the
process recommended by this study.
2. Description
The process known as CBRS is shown in Figure 2.2 [Ref. 12: p.C-30]. CBRS
is defined as:
The process for determining the Army's warfighting requirements through the
development and analysis of operational concepts [Ref. 14: p.Glossary-4].





The concept exploration phase of this system is a form of "informed
speculation". By analyzing the future threat the Army may face on the battlefield, a
projection is made on the type of missions that the Army may be called upon to
perform in this environment. Total battlefield missions, tasks, and subtasks are broken
down on a functional basis to identify where each mission area analysis should "plug
in", or have an active role. This framework for integrating the different MAAs is
referred to as the "Battlefield Mission Taxonomy" and is shown in Figure 2.3
[Ref. 12: p. C-5].
The historical perspective seeks to establish part of a foundation to look at
how missions were executed in the past, operational difficulties experienced, and ways
to implement better solutions in the future. History provides the experimental evidence
2As a result of recommendations made by the Packard Commission, the DSARC
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Figure 2.3 Battlefield Mission Taxonomy.
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to substantiate or reject principles to guide future military operations. Research done
by Hazlewood as cited by Joseph Wohl in an article on Force Management Decision
Requirements for Air Force Tactical Command and Control indicates:
Crisis management may be improved simply by providing more systematic
information on past crises that had many of the same characteristics
[Ref. 15: p.629].
The threat assessment is a critical element of each MAA. The identification of
deficiencies within mission areas is based on projections of threat force doctrine,
tactics, organizations and equipment. The threat used for evaluation must be
standardized to obtain consistency between and within different MAAs and must be
projected with the highest possible degree of accuracy. Threat forecasts should project
out to a minimum of five or more years past the last Program Objective Memorandum
(POM) outyear, since the proponent is faced with an eight to ten year materiel
acquisition cycle for a "new start" program. To facilitate this, the Army intelligence
community has developed and keeps current the following threat documents:
• Soviet Battlefield Development Plan (SBDP), prepared and updated annually by
the intelligence community under the direction of the Army Chief of Staff,
Intelligence (ACSI).
• Army Regional Threats (ART), which are expansions of selected portions of the
SBDP. They will be prepared for Europe, Southwest Asia, and Korea by the
Intelligence Threat Analysis Center (ITAC) of the Intelligence and Security
Command (INSCOM).
• Threat Assessment for Mission Areas (TAMA) data base, prepared and
maintained by TRADOC, provides threat data used for all computer analysis
and wargaming done in TRADOC. [Ref. 12: p.C-8]
Technology forecasts provide a means for a dynamic force to do more than
react to past and current threats. The advance in military capability must keep pace
with the advances in science if forces are not to become obsolete. All military forces
today have a technological base; therefore, even where a specific deficiency is not
identified in a mission area, the technological opportunities to strengthen a mission area
are explored which could provide significant leverage to U.S. forces or to potential
adversaries. [Ref. 12: pp.C20-C21] Using the best technology available gives the Army
the capability to compensate for a marked numerical advantage the enemy may possess
and provides adequate direction to the technological community to stimulate their
research in the direction of future concepts. [Ref. 13: pp.8-10]
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Concepts evolve from considerations of missions, threats, history, and
technology using this process. Utilizing the Commanding General of TRADOCs (CG)
concept guidance, a "capstone" or umbrella concept emerges to guide current and future
developments. AirLand Battle and Army 21 (formerly called AirLand Battle 2000) are
outputs of the Concept Based Requirements System. AirLand Battle furnishes the
authoritative foundation for subordinate doctrine, force design, materiel acquisition,
professional education, and individual and unit training in the present; Army 21
evolved from AirLand Battle and does the same for future systems [Refs. 16,17: pp. i,9].
"It is important at this juncture to explain what operational concepts are:~
Operational concepts provide emerging Army, joint, or multiservice doctrine that
describes battlefield capabilities for combat, combat support, or combat service
support operations for the mid term or far term. (Mid term is two to seven
years; far term is seven years and beyond.) Operational concepts are published in
TRADOC 525-series pamphlets.
As implementation of operational concepts becomes feasible with fielded or
budgeted resources, these concepts must be refined into tactics, techniques, and
procedures. Therefore, publication of a new TRADOC 525-series pamphlet
constitutes a directive to include the concept, when applicable, in field circulars,
field manuals, training circulars, programs of instruction, and Army Training and
Evaluation Program mission training plans. (Ref. 14: pp.2-1 thru 2-2]
The purpose for quoting exactly from the publication is to make a point early
in the thesis: terminology is important if one is to formulate and understand joint
doctrine^ All operational concepts do not become doctrine. Refering to Figure 2.2,
functional concepts are examined through the use of studies and wargames until they
are finally published as a TRADOC 525-series pamphlet. Then and only then are these
concepts incorporated into field manuals which contain doctrine, such as Field Manual
(FM) 100-5 which contains the AirLand Battle doctrine [Ref. 16: p. 9]. Requirements,
based on concepts which continually change, would continually change also-similar to
trying to paint a moving train.
To illustrate some more terminology, the operational concept/painting analogy
is carried further. A general rule of repainting your house approximately every three
years would parallel a doctrinal principle. Deciding how to get this done would
represent tactics. Techniques represent the methods of accomplishing the painting, such
as using a brush, roller, or spray-paint rig. The procedures represent things such as
preparation of the house itself for painting and preparation of the paint. [Ref. 18: p. 2]
22-
The standardization of terminology is accomplished to some degree by Joint
Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Publication 1, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.
Doctrine is defined in JCS Publication 1 as:
Fundamental principles by which military forces or elements thereof guide their
actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires
judgement in application. [Ref. 19: p. 118]
Tactics, derived from the Greek word "taktikos" which means to arrange, is defined in
JCS Publication I as:
_
1. The employment of units in combat.
2. The ordered arrangement and maneuver of units in relation to each other
and/or to the enemy in order to utilize their full potentialities [Ref. 19: p.359].
Sometimes the services define their own terminology. Techniques is defmed in
Army Regulation (AR) 310-25 as:
Method of performance of any act, especially the detailed methods used by
troops or commanders in performing assigned tasks. Technique refers to the
basic methods of using equipment and personnel. The phrase 'tactics and
technique' is often used to refer to the the general and detailed methods used by
commanders and forces in carrying out their assignments. [Ref. 18: p. 8]
Procedures is defmed by TRADOC as:
A particular course or mode of action that describes how to perform a certain
task [Ref. 18: p. 9].
Common usage within the services of the terms may not necessarily coincide,
even when the term is defined by JCS Publication 1. An unknown author inscribed
these words by hand on the flyleaf of an old composition text:
Words do make a difference, whether for good or ill. If our savants took more
care choosing their words during the voicing of policy, they could spend more
time in cheerful contemplation of the good result they had produced, and less
time trying to repair the damage. [Ref. 20: p. 25]
Throughout the next chapter on doctrine, key differences in terminology will be
highlighted. The differences must be surfaced, resolved, or an agreement to disagree
reached if the services are to provide more than lipservice to the word "joint". With
the differences between operational concepts and doctrine established, we return to the
discussion of Figure 2.2 and the CBRS.
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As mentioned earlier, published operational concepts and Army doctrine are
studied and analyzed during Mission Area Analyses (MAAs). Based on the established
measures of effectiveness and the results of model runs, the proponent for the study
determines the difference between the battlefield requirements and programed
capabilities. These differences will be reported as deficiencies in the ability to execute a
given task or an inability to perform the task to required standards. This examination
of deficiencies continues until the root cause of each deficiency has been identified.
[Ref. 12: p.C-6]
Once deficiencies have been identified, each MAA proponent investigates






The procedure for selecting corrective actions start with those actions which are least
expensive and most quickly implemented. Corrective actions which are more
demanding in time and resources are examined only when the less costly options do
not eliminate the deficiency.
Doctrinal solutions can usually be implemented quickly and will not strain
resources. It is essential that several new approaches be considered, that they be
innovative, and that they do not end up requiring a new organization and new materiel
for their implementation. Training solutions are not as likely to generate new
deficiencies in doctrine, organization, or materiel as can often be the case in reverse.
Training solutions do require the services to decide who will be trained and how they
will be trained. Depending on how much money is available, this can run the scale
from correspondence courses to institutional training at service schools, introduction
of organizational changes can sometimes be done quickly, but they frequently have
resource and morale implications which must be carefully considered. Institutional
forces may oppose the change, forcing any changes to to be implemented in a gradual,
evolutionary manner. The most expensive choice, new materiel, is a last resort.
Before initiating a new development program to satisfy an Army need or
deficiency, four alternatives must be considered:
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• Changing tactics, training, doctrine or organizations to satisfy a need. 3
• Improving an existing Army item to take advantage of existing training and
logistics investments.
• Buying existing domestic or foreign commercial or military equipment off the
shelf.
4
• Modifying existing commercial, other service or foreign equipment to meet a
system requirement. [Refs. 13,22: pp. 10, 1.1]
A sound approach to the analysis of tasks will pay dividends in preparing later
documents that support the materiel acquisition cycle. If deficiencies are found in
these tasks and subtasks that will require development of new equipment or
improvement to existing equipment, the proponent will have to prepare a system
employment and organization plan (SEOP) and a mission profile/ operational mode
summary (MP/OMS) for that equipment [Ref. 12: p. C-ll].
The system and organization plan (SEOP) is a narrative description of the role
and method of employment of an organization or system within the force based on
approved operational concepts for combat operations. It should describe what an
organization or system is expected to accomplish, how it is expected to perform, and
how it interacts with other organizations and systems. The mission profile/ operational
mode summary (MP/OMS) is a projection of tasks and conditions in terms of
frequency and urgency visualized for a system or force employed in military operations.
All studies which address organizations or systems will include a SEOP and MP/OMS.
[Ref. 23: p. D-l]
"These documents assist in preparing the Operational and Organizational Plan
(O&O Plan). It is prepared prior to a Justification for Major System New Start
(JMSNS) or any other requirements document; it provides a front-end agreement to
initiate the materiel acquisition process and is a mandatory element of that process.
Materiel and non-materiel requirements are then incorporated into two other
outputs of the CBRS process, Mission Area Development Plans (MADPs) and the
Battlefield Development Plan (BDP). MADPs translate corrective actions into specific
projects with milestone schedules for development. These are prepared by the
proponent for each battlefield mission area listed in Figure 2.1. The end product of the
whole process for the Army is the BDP. It is the integrating mechanism for the
3These solutions should have already been considered if the CBRS process has
been followed.
4Renewed emphasis has been placed on this option by the Chairman of the
Senate Armed Service committee, Senator Nunn. [Ref. 21]
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deficiencies identified in the four areas of doctrine, training, organization and materiel;
the prioritization of projects within MADPs must correspond to the prioritization of
deficiencies within the BDP. The BDP is reviewed by the highest levels in the Army to
insure that priorities for solving these deficiencies are correctly placed. These priorities
provide the focus for developmental efforts and help drive the research and
development process. [Ref 14: p.2-1]
C. OTHER METHODS OF ANALYSIS
A recent paper done by the Chairman of the Joint Command, Control, and
Communications (C3) curriculum at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPGS) and a
visiting professor from the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) provides a good review
of the services' methods of determining requirements. The paper, titled Requirements
in Department of Defense Acquisition, proposes a notional acquisition process
(Figure5 2.4). This is compared with the CBRS in Figure 2.5. [Ref. 24: pp.35-37] The
inputs (current forces, plans, technology, and threat), outputs (revised technology and
force plans, contract system specifications), and controls (guidance, operational
concepts) basically agree with the corresponding components of the CBRS.
Similarities also exist in these methods and a methodology developed for
evaluating C2 systems and architectures called the Modular Command and Control
Evaluation Structure (MCES). Its framework is shown in Figure 2.6 [Refs. 26,27: p. 5,
p. 7]. A comparison between it and the CBRS is graphically presented in Figure 2.7.
By formulating, bounding, and defining a problem under consideration, the MCES
performs similar steps to the CBRS's analysis of mission, threat, historical perspective,
and technology forecasts during concept exploration. Integration of these elements
and the specification of measures and data generation in MCES correspond to the
CBRS's integration of functions through a CAPSTONE concept along with the studies
and wargames used to validate the concept. These measures are aggregated and
forwarded to a decision maker in the MCES process; MAAs capture the deficiencies
and solutions, are forwarded for review by high level decision makers, and are
implemented via MADPs and the BDP. The favorable accordance between the two
schemes appear to make possible the conclusion that the C2 process and CBRS are
compatible.
5The presentation of the process conforms to the elements of the Structured
Analysis Design Technique (SADT) 1 ^1 , a trademark of SofTech, Inc. and developed
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Figure 2.6 Modular Command and Control Evaluation Structure (MCES).
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Figure 2.7 Comparison Between MCES and CBRS.
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Procedures for examining the link between requirements and operational
concepts do exist; several weaknesses in exercising the existing processes for
identification of mission deficiencies include:
• Mismatch of grand strategy to resources available.
• Service rather than geographical definition of missions.
• Lack of joint doctrine for employment.
• Disagreement on future threat levels. [Ref. 24: pp. 19-20]
Perhaps with the formation of the J7 for Doctrine and J8 for Acquisition, some
of these problems can be resolved. The method of correlating doctrine and acquisition
will have to start somewhere. If the J7 and J8 are the organizations which must
perform the correlation, then the CBRS should be considered as the means of
performing the comparison. The existing CBRS has been in use for over a decade, has
been recommended for use by other services, and bears enough of a relationship to
recent methods of analysis to perhaps be the starting place upon which to build a new
system.
D. SUMMARY
This chapter explored the link between doctrine and systems integration of new
systems. The Army's Concept Based Requirements System (CBRS) was explained in
detail. The importance of understanding the different terminology used by the services
was emphasized. A notional acquisition process and the MCES were compared with
the CBRS. Since the CBRS has been in use for over a decade, has been recommended
for use by other services, and has enough of a relationship to these recently examined
methods of analysis, the CBRS was recommended as a starting place for the J7 and J8
relationship.
The next chapter will look at service doctrine. The AirLahd Battle and Maritime
Strategy will be explained generically. How the Air Force and Army intend to conduct
the Joint Attack of the Second Echelon (J-SAK) and how the Navy and Marine Corps
intend to conduct Over-the-Horizon (OTH) missions will be explained in detail.
Common characteristics of these type missions will lead to joint requirements in the
mission area of Long Range Engagements. This will set the stage for exercising the
CBRS by considering a space-based laser to designate ground targets for attack.
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III. AIRLAND BATTLE AND THE MARITIME STRATEGY:
THE FOUNDATION FOR JOINT OPERATIONS
A. GENERAL
Chapter I asserted that a window of opportunity has opened for space support of
joint tactical operations. Chapter II examined a method of analyzing military
requirements in the context of how the war is envisioned to be fought. This-chapter
will establish the general and specific context in which space system support will be
examined in Chapter IV.
The AirLand Battle is the authoritative foundation on which the Army has based
its force design, materiel acquisition, and training products. Until recently, the Air
Force had not completely subscribed to all the principles of the concept [Refs. 28,29].
The following portion of an interview published in Airman Magazine with the Air
Force Chief of Staff, General Larry D. Webb, indicates this may not be the case now.
Question-Some critics say that joint planning and operations are failures. True
of False?
Answer-The facts say false. The record is replete with successes-in areas such
as doctrine, training, and operations-that we take for granted. Examples: The
Air Force fully supports the Army's Airland Battle Doctrine. In fact, the Air
Force helped write the 1986 version of that doctrine. . . . [Ref. 30]
This 1986 version of Field Manual (FM) 100-5 Operations contains the AirLand Battle
doctrine and provides the general context for the Army and Air Force interplay in
performing missions.
The Navy publishes The Maritime Strategy which draws together the commonly
known but sometimes unwritten6 concepts of how the Navy envisions its future
operations. Because the best developed and most detailed statements of The Maritime
Strategy had been available only in classified versions, public debate between its
supporters and detractors had often suffered from misinterpretations or exaggerations.
In January 1986, a series of unclassified articles by the Secretary of the Navy, Chief of
Naval Operations (CNO), and the Commandant of the Marine Corps appeared in a
supplement to the U.S. Naval Institute's Proceedings. This supplement provided the
6Admiral Trost, current Chief of Naval Operations, described the Maritime
Strategy over the years as "very much like the British Constitution-unwritten but
thoroughly understood by those who must practice it." [Ref. 31: p. 15]
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most definitive and authoritative statements of the Maritime Strategy that are available
in unclassified form. These articles with updated views from the current CNO provide
the general context for Navy and Marine Corps interplay in performing missions.
[Ref. 32]
Within these general contexts, common missions obviously exist. AirLand Battle
includes deep operations and the Joint Army and Air Force Attack of the Second
Echelon (J-SAK) at variable ranges7 beyond the Forward Line of Troops (FLOT).
The Maritime Strategy includes attacking land based targets at Over-the-Horizon
(OTH) ranges8 with STRIKE assets (fighter aircraft, TOMAHAWK cruise missiles).
The methods and resources for conducting long range missions are explored in greater
detail to highlight the common characteristics. A comparison will be made of the basic
principles, methods, and resources used by the services, thus setting the stage for the
examination of current and future space systems which may help fill voids in
conducting these types of missions.
B. EXPLANATION OF TERMINOLOGY
The Department of Defense (DOD) Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,
JCS Pub /, defines doctrine as:
Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide
their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires
judgement in application. [Ref. 19: p. 118]
Three other types of doctrine are also discussed:
• Combined Doctrine. Fundamental principles that guide the employment of
forces of two or more nations in coordinated action toward a common objective.
It is ratified by participating nations. [Ref. 19: p. 76]
• Joint Doctrine. Fundamental principles that guide the employment of forces of
two or more services of the same nation in coordinated action toward a common
objective. It is ratified by allfour services and may be promulgated by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. [Ref. 19: p. 196]
• Multi-Service Doctrine. Fundamental principles that guide the employment of
forces of two or three services of the same nation in coordinated action toward a
common objective. It is ratified by two or three services^ and is normally
promulgated in joint Service publications that identify the participating services,
e.g., Army-Navy doctrine. [Ref. 19: p. 237]
7
to 100 kilometers ± 50 kilometers.
8JCS Pub 1 does not defme Over-the-Horizon. The definition for over-the-
horizon radar refers to a "range of detection beyond line of sight." [Ref. 19: p. 265]
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The services articulate fundamental principles in different ways. For example, the
Army calls its fundamental doctrine capstone doctrine, while the Air Force makes a
distinction between basic, operational, and tactical doctrine. The basic doctrine of the
Air Force is found in Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1, Functions and Basic Doctrine of the
United States Air Force and provides an authoritative statement for the employment of
Air Force resources. However, unlike the Army, the Air Force has a family of basic
doctrines. AFM 1-1 is the umbrella doctrine for the family of basic doctrines which is
published in the 1 -series manuals. Operational doctrine is published in the 2-series
manuals, and each major command publishes mission-oriented doctrine in the major
command series. In Air Force writing, doctrine implies how the service plans to fight in
the immediate future, while concept implies future operations. It would seem possible
for the Air Force to agree to another service's concept, while disagreeing with their
doctrine. Until the firm statement of the Air Force Chief of Staff concerning AirLand
Battle, this divergence could have posed serious problems when attempting to write
joint Air Force and Army publications. [Refs. 33,34: pp. 29-38, p. 47]
The Navy, unlike the Army and Air Force, does not articulate fundamental
doctrine for joint and combined operations in its separate doctrinal naval warfare
publications. Instead, the Navy uses the appropriate combined and joint publications
as their fundamental doctrine for joint and combined operations. The Navy has no
"umbrella" document that integrates the many diverse aspects of naval warfare into a
unified and coherent doctrine for the planning and conduct of naval campaigns. The
Navyalso classifies the bulk of its tactical doctrine. [Refs. 33,35: pp. 33-35, p. 26]
The Marine Corps—like the Navy and unlike the Army and Air Force-does not
repeat or amplify fundamental principles for joint and combined operations that are
found in JCS publications or combined doctrine publications. However, unlike the
Navy, the Marine Corps does publish "white letters" by the Commandant of the
Marine Corps which provide guidance for the employment of Marine forces in support
of joint and combined operations. [Refs. 33: pp. 35-38]
Since fundamental principles may be expressed as capstone doctrine, basic
doctrine, strategy, or white papers, it is important to realize what one is reading, and
more importantly, what one is searching for, when interpreting and formulating future
concepts in the joint and combined areas. When accepted joint and combined doctrine
exists, it is important to realize that the services must be employed in line with that
doctrine. [Ref 33: pp.29-30]
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It can be argued that AirLand Battle doctrine and the Maritime Strategy are
semantically and substantially different. Referring again to JCS Publication 1, strategy
is defined as:
The art and science of developing and using political, economic, psychological,
and military forces as necessary during peace and war, to afford the maximum
support to policies, in order to increase the probabilities and favorable
consequences of victory and to lessen the chances of defeat. [Ref. 19: p. 346]
Navy Commander John Bradley concluded in an essay written at the Army War
College that the AirLand Battle and Maritime Strategy are compatible on the
"operational" level of war. Since most Navy tactical doctrine is classified and in
keeping with the unclassified nature of this thesis, the AirLand Battle and the Maritime
Strategy are used as the basis for comparison. The principles and attempt to articulate
a foundation and context for joint operations are the key issues. Until the J7 for
Doctrine starts publishing joint doctrine in areas where none currently exists, this
discussion represents the author's effort to start the process. The discussion is
necessary so that the CBRS method of relating doctrine to military requirements can
be examined and used.
The words used in the descriptions which follow are, as much as possible, the
exact words found in the documents referenced. This is done to permit the reader to
interpret what is meant without the author's substantial editorial revisions. Bold-face
and italicized print have been added to indicate what the author feels are key points.





The overriding mission of U.S. forces is to deter war. The services support
that mission by providing combat units to the unified and specified commands9 listed
in Figure 3.1 [Refs. 36,37,38: pp. 37-38, p. 6, p. 6], These commands are charged with
executing the military policies of the United States and waging war should deterrence
fail.
10
All military operations pursue and are governed by political objectives. The
translation of success in battle to desired political outcomes is more complicated than
ever before. Figure 3.2 [Ref. 39: p.9] illustrates the spectrum of conflict and risk.
Nuclear war represents the high risk, low probability end of the spectrum. The risk, of
escalating a lower level conflict to this level imposes unprecedented limitations on
operational flexibility. Low Intensity Conflict (LIQ on the other end will pit Army
forces against irregular or unconventional forces, enemy special operations forces, and
terrorists. LIC poses a threat to U.S. interests at all times, not just in periods of active
hostilities; fighting in the low end of the conflict spectrum requires special force
composition and task organization, rapid deployment, and restraint in the execution of
military operation. Between these extremes lies a wide range of possible conflicts
which may escalate toward nuclear war and which will almost always involve economic
and political actions as well as military activity. [Ref. 16: pp. 1-4]
The Air Force accomplishes its assigned functions through its basic operational
mission*. These are: strategic aerospace offense, strategic aerospace defense, space
operations, surveillance and reconnaissance, airlift, close air support, counterair
operations, air interdiction, and special operations. The Air Force is organized into
major commands based upon these missions: strategic offense, strategic defense,
strategic and tactical airlift, tactical support of surface forces, and training to support
these functions. These major commands are further subdivided into numbered air
forces, air divisions, groups, wings, and squadrons.
9A unified command is a command with a broad, continuing mission under a single
commander and composed of significant assigned components of two or more services.
A specified command is a command which has a broad and continuing mission and is
normally composed of one service. [Ref. 36: p.37]
10The Readiness Command has been recommended for elimination to provide
resources to activate the Special Operations Command. The Joint Deployment
Agency, an activity of the Readiness Command, will be a part of the new
Transportation Command. [Refs. 37,38: p. 6, p. 6]
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The mission of the Air Force is the prosecution of the air war. To support the
AirLand Battle, the Air Force provides the theater commander close air support for
land forces, battlefield air interdiction, tactical air reconnaissance and surveillance, air
defense, offensive counterair, air interdiction, and special air operations. For effective
employment of aerospace forces in a theater of operation, Air Force doctrine states
that the principles of centralized control, decentralized execution, coordinated effort,
common doctrine, and cooperation are essential elements and are fundamental to the
success of Air Force operations. [Ref. 33: pp. 38-40]
"- The U.S. Army's basic fighting doctrine is called the AirLand Battle. It
reflects the application of the classical principles of war to contemporary battlefield
requirements. It is called the AirLand Battle in recognition of the inherently three-
dimensional nature of modern warfare and the reliance placed on the U.S. Air Force
when conducting operations. All ground actions above the level of the smallest
engagements will be strongly affected by the supporting air operations of one or both
combatants. AirLand Battle doctrine describes an approach to generating and applying
combat power at the operational and tactical levels. It does not address the formulation
of U.S. strategies for deterrence or warfighting. It does provide leaders at all levels
with doctrinal guidance for conducting campaigns and major operations and for
fighting battles and engagements within the broader framework of military strategy.
The three levels of strategic, operational, and tactical operations will be described
shortly. The object of all operations, however, is to impose our will upon the enemy-to
achieve-our purposes. The basic elements essential to the understanding of the AirLand
Battle are shown in Figure 3.3. [Ref. 16: p. 1, p. 9, p. 14]
The Three Levels of War
The Four Tenets of AirLand Battle Doctrine
The Ten AirLand Battle Imperatives
The Three Areas of Operations
Figure 3.3 AirLand Battle Basics.
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2. The Basics
a. The Three Levels of War
Military strategy, operational art, and tactics are the broad divisions of
activity in preparing for and conducting war.
(1) Military Strategy. Military strategy, as defined in JCS Publication 1
and AirLand Battle, is the art and science of employing the armed forces of a nation or
alliance to secure policy objectives by the application or threat of force. It establishes
goals in theaters of war and theaters of operations. It assigns forces, provides assets,
and imposes conditions on the use of force. Strategy derived from policy must be
clearly understood to be the sole authoritative basis of all operations. [Ref. 16: pp.
9-10]
(2) Operational Art. Operational art is the employment of military force to
attain strategic goals in a theater of war or theater of operations through the design,
organization, and conduct of campaigns and major operations. A campaign is a series of
joint actions designed to attain a strategic objective in a theater of war. Operational
art thus involves fundamental decisions about when and where to fight and whether to
accept or decline battle. No particular echelon of command is solely or uniquely
concerned with operational art, but theater commanders and their chief subordinates
usually plan and direct campaigns, Army groups and armies normally design the major
ground operations of a campaign, and corps and divisions normally execute those
major ground operations. Operational art requires broad vision, the ability to
anticipate, a careful understanding of the relationship of means to ends, and effective joint
and combined cooperation. [Ref. 16: p. 10]
(3) Tactics. While operational art sets the objectives and pattern of
military activities, tactics 11 are the an by which corps and smaller unit commanders
translate potential combat power into victorious battles and engagements.
Engagements are small conflicts between opposed maneuver forces. Engagements are
normally conflicts of a few hours duration fought between divisions and smaller forces.
Such engagements may or may not bring on battle. Battles consist of a series of
related engagements. Battles last longer, involve larger forces, and often produce
decisions that affect the subsequent course of the campaign. Battles occur when large
forces-divisions, corps, and armies-commit themselves to fight for significant goals.
Sound tactics win battles and engagements by moving forces on the battlefield to gain
11JCS Publication 1 definition appears in Chapter II.
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positional advantage over the enemy, by applying fire support to facilitate and exploit
that advantage, and by assuring the sustainment of friendly forces before, during, and
after engagement with the enemy. Sound tactics employ all available combat, combat
support, and combat service support where they will make the greatest contribution to
victory. [Ref. 16: pp. 10-11]
At both the operational and tactical levels, the generation of combat
power requires the conversion of the potential of forces, resources, and tactical
opportunity into actual capability through violent and coordinated action concentrated
at the "decisive time and place. Superior combat power is generated through a
commander's combination of the following elements:
• Maneuver. The movement of forces in relation to the enemy to secure or retain
positional advantage.
• Firepower. Provides the destructive force essential to defeating the enemy's
ability and will to fight.
• Protection. The conservation of the fighting potential of a force so that it can
be applied at the decisive time and place.
• Leadership. The most essential element of combat power; it provides purpose,
direction, and motivation in combat. [Ref. 16: pp. 12-13]
b. The Four Tenets of AirLand Battle Doctrine
Success on the battlefield will depend on the Army's ability to fight in
accordance with the four basic tenets of initiative, agility, depth, and synchronization.
(1) Initiative. Initiative means setting or changing the terms of battle by
action.—It implies an offensive spirit in the conduct of all operations. Applied to the
force as a whole, initiative requires a constant effort to force the enemy to conform to
the operational purpose and tempo of friendly forces. Applied to individual soldiers
and leaders, it requires a willingness and ability to act independently within the
framework of the higher commander's intent. In the chaos of battle, it is essential to
decentralize decision authority to the lowest practical level because overcentralization
slows action. At the same time, decentralization risks some loss of precision in
execution. There are at least two other kinds of risk in combat. One is the risk of
losing men and equipment to attain the mission; the other is that a chosen course of
action may not be successful, or even if successful, fail to achieve the desired effect.
The commander must constantly balance these competing risks, recognizing that loss of
precision is usually preferable to inaction. [Ref. 16: pp. 15-16]
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(2) Agility. Agility, the ability of friendly forces to act faster than the
enemy, is the first prerequisite for seizing and holding the initiative. Such greater
quickness permits the rapid concentration of friendly strength against enemy
vulnerabilities. This must be done repeatedly so that by the time the enemy reacts to
one action, another has already taken place. This leads to disrupted plans and late,
uncoordinated, and piecemeal enemy responses. This has sometimes been referred to
as "acting within the enemy's decision cycle". 12
(3) Depth. Depth is the extension of operations in space} time, and
resources. Through the use of depth, a commander obtains the necessary space to
maneuver effectively, the necessary time to plan, arrange, and execute operations and
the necessary resources to win. In pursuit of operational objectives, large unit
commanders observe enemy movements in depth and protect their own vulnerabilities
throughout the theater. In conjunction with air and naval operations, they employ
maneuver, fires, and special operations to attack enemy units, facilities, and
communications throughout the theater and to force the enemy to fight battles on their
terms. Exploitation of depth in operations requires commanders to see beyond the
requirements of the moment, actively seek information on the area and the enemy in
depth, and employ every asset available to extend operations in time and space. '
[Ref. 16: pp. 16-17]
(4) Synchronization. Synchronization is the arrangement of battlefield
activities in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at the
decisive point. Synchronization is both a process and a result. Commanders
synchronize activities; they thereby produce synchronized operations. Synchronization
includes but is not limited to the actual concentration of forces and fires at the point of
decision. Some of the activities which must be synchronized in an operation-
interdiction with maneuver, for example-must occur before the decisive moment and
may take place at locations far distant from each other. While themselves separated in
time and space, however, these activities are synchronized if their combined consequences
are felt at the decisive time and place. Synchronization need not depend on explicit
coordination if all forces understand the intent of the commander, and if they have
developed and rehearsed well-conceived standard responses to anticipated
contingencies. In the chaos of battle, when communications fail and face-to-face
12A good discussion on "The Role of Time in a Command Control System"
appears in a paper written by Dr. Joel Lawson [Ref. 40].
13
"Space" in this context does not mean outer space.
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coordination is impossible, such implicit coordination may make the difference between
victory and defeat. The less that synchronization depends on active communication, the
less vulnerable it will be. [Ref. 16: pp. 17-18]
c. The Ten Imperatives of the AirLand Battle
The fundamental tenets of AirLand Battle doctrine describe the
characteristics of successful operations. While initiative, agility, depth, and
synchronization characterize successful AirLand Battle operations, the imperatives
listed below prescribe key operating requirements. These provide more specific
guidance than the principles of war and the AirLand Battle tenets; they apply to all
operations and are historically valid. The ten imperatives of AirLand Battle are:
(1) Ensure Unity of Effort. The fundamental prerequisite for unity of
effort within organizations is an effective system of command which relies upon
leadership to provide purpose, direction, and motivation. This system emphasizes well-
understood common doctrine, tactics, and techniques as well as sound unit standing
operating procedures (SOPs) and takes effective measures to limit the effects of
friction.
14 [Ref. 16: p. 23]
(2) Anticipate Events on the Battlefield. Predictions about the enemy and
even our own troops can never be relied on with certainty, but it is nevertheless
essential to anticipate what is possible and likely and prepare for those possibilities.
Anticipating events and foreseeing the shape of possibilities hours, days, or weeks in
the future are two of the most difficult skills to develop, yet among the most
important. Anticipation and foresight are critical to turning inside the enemy's decision
cycle and maintaining the initiative. [Ref. 16: p. 23]
(3) Concentrate Combat Power Against Enemy Vulnerabilities. To know
what his vulnerabilities are, commanders must study the enemy, know and take into
account his strengths, find his inherent vulnerabilities, and know how to create new
vulnerabilities which can be exploited to decisive effect. Combat power must be
concentrated to reach points of enemy vulnerability quickly without loss of synchronization.
[Ref. 16: pp. 23-24]
(4) Designate, Sustain, and Shift the Main Effort. The main effort is
assigned to the element with the most important task to accomplish within the
commander's concept. The commander concentrates his support to ensure quick
success by this element. The main effort assures synchronization in the operation while
14A term used by Clausewitz to describe the confusion and unpredictability of
war.
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leaving the greatest possible scope for initiative. If conditions change and success of the
overall mission can be obtained more cheaply or quickly another way, the commander
shifts his main effort to another force. [Ref. 16: p. 24]
(5) Press the Fight. Campaigns or battles are won by the force that is
most successful in pressing its main effort to a conclusion. Commanders must accept
risks and tenaciously press soldiers and systems to the limits of endurance for as long
as necessary. [Ref. 16: p. 24]
(6) Move Fast, Strike Hard, and Finish Rapidly. Speed has always been
important to combat operations, but it will be even more important on the next
battlefield. Engagements must be violent to shock, paralyze, and overwhelm the enemy
force quickly. They must be terminated rapidly to allow the force to disperse and avoid
effective enemy counterstrikes. [Ref. 16: p. 24]
(7) Use Terrain, Weather, Deception, and OPSEC. Terrain and weather
affect combat more significantly than any other physical factors. The ground and the
airspace immediately above it have an immense influence on how the battle will be
fought. They provide opportunities and impose limitations. Similarly, effective
deception and tight operations security (OPSEC) can enhance combat power by
confusing the enemy and reducing his foreknowledge of friendly actions. [Ref. 16: p.
24]
(8) Conserve Strength for Decisive Action. Successful commanders
conserve the strength of their forces to be stronger at the decisive time and place.
Commanders must minimize the diversion of resources to nonessential tasks and retain a
reserve for commitment when needed most. [Ref. 16: pp. 24-25]
(9) Combine Arms and Sister Services to Complement and Reinforce. The
greatest combat power results when weapons and other hardware, combat and supporting
arms, Army units, and other service elements of different capabilities are employed
together to complement and reinforce each other. Arms and services complement each
other by posing a dilemma for the enemy. As he evades the effects of one weapon,
arm, or service, he exposes himself to attack by another. Arms and services reinforce
each other when one increases the effectiveness of another or several combine to
achieve mass. [Ref. 16: p. 25]
(10) Understand the Effects of Battle on Soldiers, Units, and Leaders.
Commanders and their staffs must understand the effects of battle on soldiers, unit,
and leaders because war is fundamentally a contest of wills, fought by men not
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machines. Commanders must understand that in battle, men and units are more likely
to fail catastrophically than gradually. Commanders and staffs must be alert to small
indicators of fatigue, fear, indiscipline, and reduced morale, and take measures to deal
with these before their cumulative effects drive a unit to the threshold of collapse.
[Ref. 16: pp. 25-26]
d. The Three Areas of Operations
Close, rear, and deep operations comprise a special and continuous
synchronization requirement. For commanders at division and above, synchronization
of close,, rear, and deep operations will normally require deliberate planning and staff
coordination since such operations will frequently employ different assets. At brigade
and below, these activities are practically indistinguishable and will usually be conducted
with the same assets. At every level, however, commanders must understand the
relationship among these three arenas and their combined impact on the course of
battle.
(1) Close Operations. Close operations at any echelon comprise the
current activities of major committed combat elements, together with their immediate
combat support and combat service support. At the operational level, close operations
comprise the efforts of large tactical formations—corps and divisions—to win current
battles. At the tactical level, close operations comprise the efforts of smaller tactical
units to win current battles or. engagements. At any echelon, close operations include
the close, deep, and rear operations of subordinate elements. Not all activities taking
place _in_ proximity to the line of contact are close operations. Activities are part of
close operations if they are designed to support the current fight. Close operations
bear the ultimate burden of victory or defeat. The measure of success of deep and rear
operations is their eventual impact on close operations. [Ref. 16: p. 19}
(2) Rear Operations. Rear operations at any echelon comprise activities
rearward of elements in contact designed to assure freedom of maneuver and continuity of
operations, including continuity of sustainment and command and control. Four rearward
activities in particular must be conducted as part of rear operations:
• Assembly and Movement of Reserves.
• Redeployment of Fire Support.
• Maintenance and Protection of the Sustainment Effort.
• Maintenance of Command and Control.
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In addition to these critical activities, others relevant to rear operations include
establishment and maintenance of lines of communications (LOCs), traffic regulation
and control, medical and field services, refugee control and maintenance of civil order.
By themselves, none of these activities would normally have much impact on the
current battle. However, because it is precisely these activities which will be the targets
of the enemy's deep operations, their protection can easily begin to divert needed assets
from the forward battle. [Ref. 16: pp. 20-21]
(3) Deep Operations. Deep operations at any echelon comprise activities
directed against enemy forces not in contact designed to influence the conditions in which
future close operations will be conducted. At the operational level, deep operations
include efforts to isolate current battles and to influence where, when, and against whom
future battles will be fought. At the tactical level, deep operations are designed to
shape the battlefield to assure advantage in subsequent engagements. At both levels,
successful deep operations create the conditions for future victory. Such operations are
not new to warfare. The concept of interdicting the enemy's supplies, follow-on forces,
reserves, and communications to impede his ability to commit these at times and places
of his choosing is a familiar feature of modern war. The principal difference in such
operations today is the increasing availability of means to conduct them at the tactical as
well as the operational level. Deep operations must be synchronized with the scheme of
maneuver. Deep operations support tactical offensive operations by isolating the
battlefield from reinforcing or counterattacking reserves, disrupting the enemy's
combined arms cooperation and operational command and control, and destroying or
degrading his sustaining support. Deep operations support defensive operations by
creating windows of opportunity for decisive action against leading enemy echelons.
Areas of operations and interest15 must extend far enough forward of the FLOT to
give the commander time to react to approaching enemy forces, to assess his
operations, and to execute operations accordingly. Even in conventional combat, these
operations will rarely maintain a linear character. The speed with which today's forces
15
Tactical commanders fight the enemy in an area of operations, a specific zone or
sector assigned to them. They must also identify and monitor enemy activity outside
their areas of operations which could affect their future operations. This larger area varies
in size and shape and is called an area of interest. Author's note: Area of influence is
contained in documents published earlier than 1986 and in JCS Pub 1. It is defined as
the assigned area of operations wherein a land commander is capable of acquiring and
fighting enemy units with assets organic to or in support of his command or area of
operations.
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can concentrate and the high volumes of supporting fires they can bring to bear will
make the intermingling of opposing forces nearly inevitable. Similarly, from the first
hours of battle, deep reconnaissance, air mobility, long-range fires, and special
operating forces will blur the distinction between front and rear. [Ref. 16: p. 2, p. 19]
3. The Methods and Resources of Conducting Deep Operations
a. Methods
(1) Activities. Among the activities typically conducted as part of deep
operations are:
• Deception.
• Deep surveillance and target acquisition.
• Interdiction (by ground or air fires, ground or aerial maneuver, special operating
forces (SOF), or any combination of these).
• Command, control, and communications countermeasures.
• Command and control.
Because of the relative scarcity of resources with which to perform these activities, deep
operations must be focused against those enemy capabilities which most directly
threaten the success of projected friendly operations. At the operational and tactical
levels, the principal targets of deep operations are the freedom of action of the opposing
commander and coherence and tempo of his operations. Enemy reserves, fire support
elements, command and control facilities, and other high value assets beyond the line
of contact are potential targets for attack. Target development is an intelligence
activityjhat supports the commander's efforts to identify, locate, and strike high value
targets as part of his deep operations plan. In order to assess target value, candidate
targets must be evaluated using tactically meaningful criteria. High value targets are
those which are:
• Relevant to the overall operation planned or in progress in that they can affect
the force's ability to accomplish the mission.
• Most threatening to accomplishment of the mission. Since not all relevant
targets can be dealt with, they must be prioritized.
• Most damaging to the coherence of enemy operations. Among relevant and
threatening targets, these are the targets of choice.
Intelligence officers develop basic target information, then employ intelligence,
surveillance, and target-acquisition assets to locate targets accurately enough for attack.
Following such attacks, intelligence officers assess their efforts and monitor the target
to assure that the commander's intention has been accomplished. Only in rare cases
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will commanders be able to destroy enemy forces in depth. However, they will often be
able to delay, disrupt, or divert selected enemy forces by destroying portions of those
forces, by interrupting their support, or by creating obstacles in depth.
(2) Joint Attack of the Second Echelon (J-SAK). The operational
concept and procedures for attacking deep targets are contained in two joint U.S.
Readiness Command (USREDCOM), Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC),
and Tactical Air Command (TAC) pamphlets. They are:
• Joint Operational Concept for J-SAK--USREDCOM Pam 525-4, TRADOC
J>am 525-16, 16 TACP 50-26.
• General Operating Procedures for J-SAK--USREDCOM Pam 525-8, TRADOC
Pam 525-45, TACP 50-29.
The command and control organization for attacking second echelon 17 targets with air
and land forces is shown in Figure 3.4 [Ref. 42: p. 2-3]. The concept and procedures
describe the targeting process and also acknowledge that interdiction operations can be
conducted by sea forces. [Refs. 41,42: pp. 1-1 thru 1-3, p. 1-1]
The Joint Force Commander (JFC) has operational command18 of all
assigned forces. The JFC's concept of operations lists the guidance and objectives for
attack of the second echelon. Operational command is exercised through the
subordinate component commanders. Special operations forces, which are normally
controlled at the joint force level, may enhance second echelon attack through target
acquisition, target attack, human intelligence, and personnel recovery operations
[Ref. 43]. Air apportionment is the responsibility of the JFC. Air apportionment is the
determination and assignment of the total expected tactical air (TACAIR) effort\ by
percentage or priority, that should be devoted to the various tactical air operations or
geographical areas for a given time. The air apportionment process prioritizes the
TACAIR effort among the following missions:
16Recall from Chapter II that a 525-series pamphlet constitutes a directive to
include the concept in training and doctrinal publications.
The second echelon is defined as enemy ground military formations not directly
engaged in the battle at the FLOT and held behind the forces in contact as a reserve
force, a Soviet-style second echelon, operational maneuver group, or follow-on force.
18Operational command does not include such matters as administration, discipline,
internal organization, and unit training, except when a subordinate commander requests
assistance. The term is synonymous with "operational control" and is uniquely applied
to the operational control exercised by the commanders of unified and specified commands
over assigned forces in accordance with the National Security Act of 1947, as amended





















Figure 3.4 Command and Control for J-SAK.
Air Interdiction (AI)
Counter Air (CA)
Close Air Support (CAS)
Tactical Surveillance and Reconnaissance
Tactical Airlift
Special Operations
The air interdiction apportionment establishes the percentage or priority of effort for
AI and battlefield air interdiction 19(BAI). Apportionment will be accomplished by the
Air Component Commander (ACC) and submitted to the joint force commander for
approval.
The ACC is responsible for insuring close combat and general
support are provided to land forces. Close combat support is provided by CAS
missions flown to attack targets in close proximity to friendly land forces. General
support is provided by interdicting the enemy's combat power before it can be brought to
19Air interdiction (AI) operations delay, disrupt, divert, or destroy an enemy's
military potential before it can be brought to bear effectively against friendly forces.
Battlefield Air Interdiction (BAI) operations are air interdiction attacks against targets
which have a near term effect on the operations or scheme of maneuver of friendly
forces, but are not in close proximity to friendly forces. [Ref. 16: pp. 48-49]
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bear on friendly forces and by attaining and maintaining air superiority. General support
attack missions are provided by the TACAIR missions of air interdiction and counter
air. The Tactical Air Control Center (TACC) is the operational facility in which the
ACC and elements of his tactical headquarters operations and intelligence staff have
centralized the functions of planning, directing, and control over TACAIR resources.
[Ref. 42: p. 3-2]
The Land Component Commander (LCC) is responsible for nominating
BAI targets of interest for all land echelons through the Battlefield Coordination
Element (BCE) to the ACC prior to the allocation of TACAIR resources. Tne BCE
represents the LCC and is colocated with the TACC. The TACC determines which
targets can be attacked with the available air resources and may recommend alternative
targets based upon intelligence, environmental factors, and aircraft capabilities. The
LCC makes his priorities and guidance sufficiently clear so that his BCE chief20 is able
to prioritize the competing land force needs of subordinate units for tactical support.
In an emergency, with no communications with the LCC, the BCE is delegated the
authority by the LCC to adjudicate competing land force needs for tactical support.
Similarly, the ACC has the full authority to order an airborne diversion in those
instances when the situation dictates it (change of target, mission, or destination).
[Ref. 42: p. 2-12, pp. 3-2 thru 3-12]
The means for implementing tactical air support is the Air Tasking
Order (ATO). The ATO tasks units to accomplish specific missions and provides
sufficient detail to enable mission aircrews to execute these missions. Before 48 hours
until mission execution, the LCC must prioritize his BAI requests and consult with the
ACC on the apportionment decision. At 36 hours out, the ACC submits the air
apportionment recommendation at which time it is approved or modified. From 36
hours until the time to launch, the assignment of attack assets to targets through the
targeting process is accomplished. The ATO is published at 12 hours before mission
execution. [Ref. 42: pp. 5-1 thru 5-13]
Corps orient on the operational level of war. The corps area of interest
is 96 hours forward of the FLOT. National, Air Force and Army intelligence systems
identify, locate, and track enemy forces; this information is relayed to the All Source
Intelligence Center (ASIC). Corps second echelon targets are attacked primarily by
TACAIR. [Refs. 16,42: pp. 46-47, pp. 4-1 and 4-2]
20This position is authorized an Army Colonel (06) in the Table of Organization
and Equipment (TOE) [Ref. 42: p. 3-4].
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. (3) Targeting Process. Targeting is the process through which targets
are selected for attack, desired results are determined, and weapons are selected.
Desired results are based on a stated mission, force posture and capability, doctrine,
plans and intelligence.









Figure 3.5 Targeting Process for J-SAK.
The process is shown in Figure 3.5 and is described below:
(1) Establishing Objectives and Priorities. Attack of the second echelon will be
guided by the joint force commander's objectives and priorities. Once the
—joint force commander has issued guidance concerning objectives, subordinate
commanders begin the targeting process by issuing specific guidance in
support of their concept of operations.
(2) Collecting Information. Effective targeting decisions depend on a responsive
intelligence collection program and construction and maintenance of a reliable
data base. The first step in collecting information is Intelligence Preparation
of the Battlefield (IPB). This begins as soon as the area of operations is
identified and requires continuous updating.
(3) Detection. Detection of targets involves the discovery of a new potential
target or a significant change to an existing one. Terrain and traffic pattern
analysis, combined with sensor and intelligence reports,, and enemy order of
battle, must be used in the detection of targets of military value.
(4) Location. Newly detected targets must be located accurately within designated
reference systems. Fixed targets (Bridges, road junctions, mine emplacement,
hardened C3I sites) are designated by grid coordinates. Targets which exhibit
limited dwell time or cannot be accurately fixed by grid coordinates (Mobile
command posts, transportable bridging equipment) are designated by four sets
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of grid coordinates which outline the probable target engagement zone.
[Ref. 42: p. 5-5]
(5) Identification. Each target will be analyzed and evaluated, based on the
following criteria:
• The desired effect and relationship to the land commander's plan of
maneuver.
• The contribution the target makes to the execution and cohesion of the
defense or momentum of attacking units.
• The time or location on the battlefield where the target makes its greatest
contribution to the cohesion or integrity of the second echelon force as it
moves to battle.
• The effect at the FLOT as a result of disruption, delay, and destruction of
targets at their present location on the battlefield.
(6) Decision. Once detected, located, and identified, targets are further analyzed
to determine their significance in light of available weapon systems resources.
This includes determining the vulnerability of the target to terrain denial
operations, the vulnerability of the target to friendly weapon systems at its
present location and as it moves toward the FLOT, and the threat that the
target and target environment pose to air and land operations. At this point,
a commitment to a course of action is made. Air Force tactical air control
party personnel will advise corps and divisions on the capabilities and
limitations of tactical air forces to attack potential targets. Land commanders
must decide whether to attack targets with organic or supporting land assets
or identify targets to the next higher level of command.
(7) Execution. In this phase, the planned action is carried out either by the
ground commander with organic or supporting land attack assets or by Air
—
Force assets under the control of the TACC acting for the air component
commander.
(8) Assessment. Assessment identifies the impact of attacking enemy forces,
facilities, capabilities and activities. A responsive system of post attack
analysis to include inflight reports, evaluation and feedback is required. The
headquarters responsible for initial target nomination is also primarily
responsible for initiating post attack analysis and must actively seek post




The primary resources for performing deep operations are:
• Tactical air (TACAIR) support.
• Long-range artillery.
• Attack helicopter units.
• Electronic warfare systems.
• Special operating forces.
• Air assault and airborne units.
Divisional brigades and smaller tactical units do not normally conduct separate deep
operations. Corps and larger units have access to service and national intelligence
collection means which directly support the planning and conduct of deep operations.
Divisions, separate brigades, and regiments must depend more heavily on intelligence
obtained by higher levels of command for their operations in depth. A thorough
Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) and timely intelligence from organic
and supporting sources help to identify targets. Named areas of interest (NAI),
covering routes or avenues of approach, directions of enemy movement, and specific
enemy units are the critical points in an area of interest. They focus the intelligence
collection effort and the unit fires during the battle. Close coordination between levels
of command is necessary to assure that deep operations plans support the overall
concept of operations and neither duplicate nor impede each other.
The primary strike assets for deep attack are aerial, artillery, and missile
weapons^ Some of the platforms and munitions used to accomplish these deep strike
missions are shown in Figure 3.6. Laser systems and munitions are emphasized here
and will be also be emphasized in the Maritime Strategy discussion which follows. The
reason for this will be discussed in the Comparison section of this chapter. [Ref. 44]
Special Operations Forces (SOF) conduct operations deep in the enemy's
rear and usually concentrate on strategic and operational goals. These goals include
interdicting enemy lines of communications and destroying military and industrial
facilities. Special forces elements can deploy unilaterally into the enemy's rear area to
assist in the attack of uncommitted enemy forces by locating, identifying, and
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Figure 3.6 Army and Air Force Platforms and Munitions.
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Special forces detachments may have the following missions:
• Intelligence collection.
• Target acquisition.
• Terminal guidance for strike aircraft and missile systems.
• Interdiction of critical transportation targets.




In the early 1980s, the public Maritime Strategy discussion had largely taken
the form of a debate on the pages of American public and foreign affairs and national
security periodicals. This debate focused on two themes: The general forward strategic
principles (and certain highly publicized Norwegian Sea examples) enunciated
repeatedly by then-Secretary of the Navy John F. Lehman, Jr. and an alleged
"Maritime Strategy versus Coalition Warfare" dichotomy propounded by former Under
Secretary of Defense Robert Komer and others. [Ref. 45: p. 113]
At the same time, the staffs of the Chief of Naval Operations and the
Commandant of the Marine Corps-4n conjunction with officers of the other services
and allies-had been tasked to develop for internal use a detailed description of the
Maritime Strategy component of U.S. national military strategy. This Maritime
Strategy^ integrated into one clear, consistent document the following:
• A number of long held views of Navy and Marine Corps senior officers. 21
• Certain newly refined concepts developed in the fleet and at the Naval War
College.
• Agreed national intelligence estimates.
• The strategic principles articulated by Secretary Lehman.
Concepts developed by the Navy's warfare communities and fleets, as well as by Army,
Air Force, joint, and allied commanders, were examined and incorporated as
appropriate. The job was spearheaded by the Strategic Concepts Group on the staff of
the Chief of Naval Operations. [Ref. 45: p. 113]
21The current CNO states: "The Maritime Strategy represents a consensus of
professional opinion and carries the acceptance of both the U.S. Government and the
governments of our allies" [Ref. 31: p. 15].
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In 1984, the Maritime Strategy was approved by Admiral James D. Watkins,
then-Chief of Naval Operations, and General P.X. Kelley, Commandant of the Marine
Corps. In late 1985, Secretary Lehman, Admiral Watkins, and General Kelley-having
ensured that the Maritime Strategy met their requirements and represented both their
thinking and that of their superiors-- submitted manuscripts containing the strategy's
basic tenets to the Naval Institute; these articles were published in a special
supplement to the January 1986 Proceedings. [Ref. 45: p. 113]
The Maritime Strategy, set in the context of national strategy, emphasizes
coalition warfare, the criticality of allies, and the cooperation of the other services. It




It recognizes that the unified and specified commanders listed in Figure 3.1 fight the
wars. It does not purport to be a detailed war plan with firm timelines, tactical
doctrine, or specific target sets. It is designed to support campaigns in ground theaters of
operations both directly and indirectly and thus places great emphasis on joint operations.
[Ref. 46]
The goal of the overall Maritime Strategy is to use maritime power, in
combination with the efforts of the other services and forces of the allies, to bring
about "war termination on favorable terms. In a global war, the objectives are to:
• Deny the Soviets their kind of war by exerting global pressure, indicating that
the conflict will be neither short nor localized.
• Destroy the Soviet Navy: both important in itself and a necessary step to
realize other objectives.
• Influence the land battle by limiting re-deployment of forces, by ensuring
reinforcement and resupply, and by direct application of carrier air and
amphibious power.
• Terminate the war on terms acceptable to the United States and the allies
through measures such as threatening direct attack against the enemy's
homeland or changing the nuclear correlation of forces.
The Strategy is a design for relating means to ends. The ends are clear: deterrence or-
should deterrence fail-war termination on terms favorable to the United States and its
allies. The means are also clear: the 600-ship Navy.22 The basic concepts essential to
the understanding of the Maritime Strategy are shown in Figure 3.7. [Ref. 46]
22Admiral Trost has written: (The Maritime Strategy) "was not--and is not~a





(1) Deterrence or Transition to War
(2) Seizing the Initiative
(3) Carrying the Fight to the Enemy
Figure 3.7 Maritime Strategy Basics.
2. The Basics
a. Peacetime Presence
Sea power is relevant across the spectrum of conflict, from routine
operations in peacetime to the provision of the most survivable component for
deterring strategic nuclear war. The Maritime Strategy provides a framework for
considering all uses of maritime power. Figure 3.8 illustrates the spectrum of conflict
and draws attention to the importance of the lower levels of violence where navies are
most often the key actors. The key goal of the peacetime strategy is to further
international stability through support of regional balances of power. The more stable
the international environment, the lower the probability that the Soviets will risk war
with the West. This goal is accomplished through a variety of peacetime operations
including naval ship visits to foreign ports and training and exercises with foreign naval
forces. [Ref. 46: pp. 7-8]
b. Crisis Response
The heart of the evolving Maritime Strategy is crisis response. If war with
the Soviets ever comes, it will probably result from a crisis that escalates out of control.
The ability to contain and control crises is an important factor in the ability to prevent
global conflict. Between 1946 and 1982, in some 250 instances of employment of
American military forces, naval forces constituted the principal element of the response
in about 80% of the crises. Reasons for selecting naval forces as the instrument of












Figure 3.8 The Spectrum of Conflict-Navy.
Forward-deployed posture and rapid mobility make naval forces readily
available at crisis locations worldwide.
Naval forces maintain consistently high states of readiness because of forward
deployments.
Naval forces increasingly operate with friendly and allied armed forces and the
other services.
Naval forces can be sustained indefinitely at distant locations, with logistics
support relatively independent of foreign basing or overflight rights.
Naval forces bring the range of capabilities required for credible deterrence such
as maintaining presence, conducting surveillance, threatening the use of force,
conducting naval gunfire or air strikes, landing Marines, evacuating civilians,
establishing a blockade or quarantine, and preventing intervention by Soviet or
other forces.
Naval forces have unique escalation control characteristics that contribute to
effective crisis control. Naval forces can be intrusive or out of sight,
threatening or non-threatening, and easily dispatched but just as easily
withdrawn. 23
23The current CNO states: "Operating in international waters, it {the Navy)
enjoys the unique advantage of being able to signal menace without violating sovereignty,
and once the need is past, of being able to sail over the horizon without signalling retreat
[Ref. 31: p. 14].
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If the peacetime presence and crisis response tasks are done well, deterrence is far less
likely to fail. Deterrence can fail, however, and the next section describes how the
Navy would be used in a global war against the Soviets. [Ref. 46: p. 8]
c. Warfighting
Should war come, the Soviets would prefer to use their massive ground
force advantage against Europe without having to concern themselves with a global
conflict or with actions on their flanks. The key to countering this is to ensure the
Soviets will have to face the prospect of prolonged global conflict. The strategy for
performing this consists of three phases: deterrence or the transition to war, seizing the
initiative, and carrying the fight to the enemy. There are no fixed time frames associated
with these phases; they provide a broad outline of what is to be accomplished.
[Ref. 46: p. 8]
(1) Deterrence or Transition to War. The initial phase of the Maritime
Strategy would be triggered by recognition that a specific international situation has
the potential to grow to a global superpower confrontation. The goal of this phase is
deterrence. Keys to the success of both the initial phase and the strategy as a whole are
speed and decisiveness in national decisionmaking. As more functions are transferred to
the reserve forces, execution of the President's authority to call up reservists24 becomes
increasingly crucial to successful implementation of the strategy. The United States
must be in position to deter the Soviets' "battle of the first salvo" or deal with that if it
comes. Even though a substantial fraction of the fleet is forward deployed in
peacetime, prompt decisions are needed to permit rapid forward deployment of additional
forces in crisis. The need for forward movement is obvious. This is where the Soviet
fleet will be, and this is where the Navy must be prepared to fight. Aggressive forward
movement of anti-submarine warfare forces, both submarines and maritime patrol
aircraft, will force Soviet submarines to retreat into defensive bastions, to protect their
ballistic missile submarines. This both denies the Soviets the option of a massive, early
attempt to interdict the sea lines of communication and counters such operations against
them that the Soviets undertake. [Ref. 46: pp. 8-10]
(2) Seizing the Initiative. If war comes, the Navy will seize the initiative
as far forward as possible. Seizing the initiative is vital for several reasons:
24This call up is currently limited to 100,000. Virtually the entire Navy cargo-
handling capability and all Navy combat search and rescue capability, for example,
depend on reservists. [Ref. 46: p. 10]
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• It demonstrates to the allies the United States' determination to prevail and
contributes to alliance solidarity.
• The history of war indicates that gaining the initiative is the key to destroying an
opponent's forces.
• Seizing the initiative opens the way to apply pressure on the Soviets to end the
war on our terms—the new goal of the strategy once deterrence has failed.
Seizing the initiative is accomplished through the Navy classic tasks of: •
• Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW)
• Antisurface Warfare .(ASUW)
• Antiair Warfare (AAW)
• STRIKE Operations





ASW will be conducted to prevent leakage of enemy forces to the
open ocean where the Western Alliance's resupply lines can be threatened. ASUW
involves carriers, submarines, cruise missile-equipped surface ships, and land-based
forces eliminating forward-deployed Soviet surface ships. AAW demands offense and
defense in depth, long range indication and warning, long range interception and
surveillance, and base neutralization; it is an area where the contribution of the allies
and other services is particularly important for the overriding goal is to counter the
Soviets' missile launching platforms: to shoot the archer before he releases his arrows.
Successes in ASW, ASUW, and AAW are crucial to effective prosecution of offensive
STRIKE warfare. To apply strike capability, carriers must be moved into positions
where, combined with the U.S. Air Force and allied forces, they can bring to bear
added strength needed on NATO's Northern or Southern flanks, or in Northeast Asia.
The strike power of carrier battle forces can also be augmented with conventional land-
attack TOMAHAWK cruise missiles launched from submarines or surface ships.
[Ref. 46: p. 12]
(3) Carrying the Fight to the Enemy. The tasks in this phase are similar
to those of earlier phase, but must be more aggressively applied as war termination is
sought on favorable terms to the United States and its allies. The goal would be to
complete the destruction of all Soviet fleets which was begun in the second phase.
59
During this phase, the United States and allies would press home the initiative
worldwide, while continuing to support air and land campaigns, maintaining sealift,
and keeping sea lines of communication open.
The various tasks in all phases of the Maritime Strategy must be
implemented simultaneously on, over, and under the sea. The forces combine in a
synergistic way, both to deter and to win if deterrence fails. The complexity of the
tasks makes it essential that the war not be micro-managed from Washington, but
rather that options and broad concepts be provided to assist the unified commanders in
implementing their detailed plans. Command, control, communications, and
intelligence (C3I) combine to form the glue that binds this entire effort together.
Space" is an essentialfactor in command, control, communications, and intelligence. The
Navy is the number one tactical user of information from space. The information is
recovered, fused in real time, and continuously disseminated to all tactical users at sea.
Although the importance of space has long been understood intuitively, the Maritime
Strategy clarifies the essentiality of space for a Navy with global responsibilities.
[Ref. 46: p. 13]
3. The Methods and Resources of Conducting Over-the-Horizon Operations
a. Methods
Figure 3.9 [Ref 47] lists the dominant activities and establishes the context
for modeling the antisurface warfare (ASUW) and STRIKE mission areas. Even
though this description was taken from a research contribution done solely for the
ASUW_mission area, the author asserts that STRIKE warfare uses some of the same
methods and resources to conduct its missions.
The major tasks are to find targets, allocate assigned forces for the attack,
and prosecute the engagement. The engagements envisioned involve beyond line-of-
sight (BLOS) or Over-the-Horizon (OTH) communications, weapons, and sensors;
some of these may not be under the control of the Officer in Tactical Command
(OTC). He needs status information from outside. Operations of the enemy and the
U.S. task group proceed under basic strategic, tactical, and doctrinal guidelines and in
the natural and manmade environments where engagement occurs. An engagement,
from assignment of the attack mission until completion of the last attack, may last
several days. The process shown in Figure 3.9 is described below:
25
"Space" in this context does refer to outer space.
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(1) Locate Targets and Attackers
(2) Assess Situation: Plan Allocation of Attackers to Targets
(3) Move to Create Engagement Opportunities
(4) Reassess and Give Orders to Attack or Abort
(5) Execute Engagement
Figure 3.9 The Engagement Process for ASUW.
(1) Locate Targets and Attackers. The processing of sensory data
(electromagnetic and acoustic emissions and reflections) into raw detection
(positions and frequencies) is done by detection systems both inside and
outside of the task force. The classification of platform type suffices for
assignment of responsibility for action to one of the defensive mission
managers (ASW, AAW, ASUW). The identification (friend, foe, or unknown)
of a detected entity is equivalent to establishing its intent and is used to decide
whether engagement is to take place.
(2) Assess Situation: Plan Allocation of Attackers to Targets. The condition of all
forces is assessed before, during, and after an engagement. Enemy status may
be more difficult to determine; various tactical publications and damage
assessment rules must therefore be applied. Planning produces a list (in order
of priority) of feasible attack assignments against targets. The choice of a
particular plan from among these possible attacks involves an estimate of the
possible outcome. After consideration of the externally imposed constraints
and strategic objectives, a basic operational plan can be issued.
(3) Move to Create Engagement Opportunities. Each attack platform commander
is constrained by the operational plan he is given. He then develops his
implementation plans in accordance with local conditions and the mobility
status and weapon envelopes of his platforms. His planning must take into
account countermeasures by the targets and may be based on existing tactical
concepts. Eventually, the commander may decide that he either has an
engagement opportunity or cannot attain one. This result is reported and is
the basis for orders from the OTC.
(4) Reassess and Give Orders to Attack or Abort. A change in the status of
engagement opportunities (either that they now exist or that they are
unattainable) requires the OTC to decide how to act. He must, accordingly,
update the effectiveness assessment he made when drawing up his initial plans
and adjust the attacker-target pairing assignments. Operational orders are
then revised with particular attention paid to the force's defensive posture.
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(5) Execute Engagement. The attack platform commander is responsible for
execution of the attack. Decisions about which weapon to use depend on the
availability of the systems; these may be in use for other missions or may be
entirely inoperative. In Over-the-Horizon engagements, good data on target-
attacker location is crucial for a fire control solution. Similarly, continuous
control and monitoring of the launched weapon is tenuous without special
sensors. The actual impact of the weapon may or may not be observed, thus
making the weapon status information only occasionally available. This
information is fed back for assessing engagement results and deciding on a
plan for reattack, if needed.
* b. Resources —
The primary strike assets for attacking land-based OTH targets are aerial
and missile weapons systems. The aerial means are carrier based fighter aircraft
carrying a variety of munitions and the missile is the TOMAHAWK cruise missile.
(1) Attack Aircraft. Carrier based attack aircraft provide the platforms
from which a variety of munitions can be launched against OTH land-based targets.
Some of the platforms and munitions used in these missions appear in Figure 3.10,
with the emphasis again on laser systems and munitions. [Ref. 44]
(2) TOMAHAWK Cruise Missiles. The TOMAHAWK cruise missile
provides the long-range striking power against surface and land targets previously
found only in tactical aircraft. Although the TOMAHAWK is not a substitute for fleet
tactical aircraft, it does provide a significant increase in fleet standoff range and
firepower. The range of a TOMAHAWK is approximately 250 miles; 60 to 100
TOMAHAWKS are approximately the equivalent of 30 combat loaded A-6Bs. The
TOMAHAWK gives the commander convincing options other than the commitment of
a carrier. The peacetime presence of a single destroyer on the horizon of a troubled
country can provide the same possibility of naval intervention ashore that in the past
required the carrier-and her absence somewhere else. It provides a crisis response by
permitting precise surgical strikes of specific high-value targets without any possibility



































































































Figure 3.10 Navy and Marine Corps Platforms and Munitions.
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Cruise missiles are basically nuclear or conventionally armed weapons
powered by turbofan engines. They fly at subsonic speed (about 0.5 Mach) and are
guided, with the exception of one version, by an inertial guidance unit updated by a
terrain contour matching (TERCOiM) system. This system matches scenes detected on
the actual flight path with digital maps stored in the missile's computer. Five types of
cruise missiles are currently in production. The air-launched cruise missile (ALCM),
ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM), and TLAM/N model of the TOMAHAWK
sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM) are nuclear. The other SLCMs are the
conventionally armed TLAM/C for attacking tactical land-based targets and a
conventionally armed TOMAHAWK anti-ship cruise missile (TASM) for destroying
enemy surface ships and submarines. [Ref. 49: pp. 47-64]
The missiles could be used preceding TACAIR strikes in order to
suppress target defenses. This combination could reduce aircraft attrition and increase
the level of damage inflicted on the target. There is clearly a tradeoff between using
TOMAHAWK and TACAIR. If the "cost" of the mission is driven by expected
aircraft attrition rates or the air wing is otherwise engaged, then the TOMAHAWK is
an appropriate choice of strike weapon. [Ref. 48: pp. 52-53]
The TOMAHAWK land-attack missiles' candidate targets are
generally those considered to be high leverage. TOMAHAWK land-attack missiles are
suitable for employment in three general strike roles:
• Defense Suppression. Candidate targets include enemy command and control
- facilities, Surface to Air Missile (SAM) sites, and aircraft on the ground.
• Surgical Strike. Potential targets could include power stations, oil refineries,
and fuel and munition depots.
• Interdiction. Targets could include railyards, bridges, dams, port facilities, and
airfields. [Ref. 48: p. 52-53]
E. COMPARISON
A favorable comparison between the Maritime Strategy and AirLand Battle
doctrine can be made in several areas. The discussion parallels the order in which the
AirLand Battle and Maritime Strategy were previously presented and represents the




The objective of all operations in the AirLand Battle is to impose the
United States' will upon the enemy--to achieve U.S. purposes. The goal of the overall
Maritime Strategy is deterrence--or should deterrence fail-to use maritime power to
bring about war termination on favorable terms. Recalling that military strategy is
derived from policy, these statements of objectives would appear to be compatible if
"U.S. purposes" and "favorable terms" are compatible. The author believes the intent
of thesV phrases in both documents is to emphasize that military operations are
undertaken solely to achieve stated policy objectives issued by the civilian political
leaders of the country. In this regard, the documents are in harmony.
b. Level of War
Operational art in AirLand Battle doctrine is the employment of military
forces to attain strategic goals; it requires "a careful understanding of the relationship
of means to ends". The Maritime Strategy is "a design for relating means to ends".
The conclusion reached by Commander Bradley in his War College essay would appear
to be correct: the basic doctrines are one in the same at the operational level of war.
[Ref 50: pp. 12-14]
c. Tenets
Initiative is the first AirLand Battle tenet. Seizing the Initiative is the
second phase in the Warfighting portion of the Maritime Strategy. Agility, as the
secondAirLand Battle tenet, could be compared on the level of moving forces to where
they can influence the battle. The Army has recently recognized the need for lighter
forces, with the accompanying ability to move them quickly to where they are needed.
The Maritime Strategy emphasizes the need for politicians to allow for early
deployment and activation of reserves so that forces can be brought to bear, should
they be needed. The combination of these tenets and requirements underscore the
absolute need for civilian political leaders to allow for positioning of forces early so
that a military response will remain viable; otherwise, the initiative will not be seized
and military options will be less than optimal.
Fighting the war in depth and synchronizing joint and combined operations
pervade both documents. For the AirLand Battle, the concept of depth is a tenet and
is included as an area of operations. In the Transition to War and Warfighting
portions of the Maritime Strategy, force projection and "shooting the archer before he
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releases his arrows" are key elements of the overall plan to limit the enemy's ability to
influence or enter the battle at a later date. Conducting joint deep operations requires
synchronization. Both the AirLand Battle and Maritime Strategy acknowledge the
need for the other services bringing the enemy under their combined forces' strength.
Performing tasks simultaneously on, over, and under the sea requires synchronization
in order to prevent fratricide. Bringing four services and their allies together, without
fratricide or collateral damage, at the correct place and time to maximize firepower,
requires synchronization. Whether expressly called that or not, the requirement for
joint deep operations will require synchronization. ~~
d. Area of Operations
Rear battle for the Army contains the Navy's actions to maintain the sea
lines of communication (SLOC). The rear battle in a nautical sense can also be
thought of in terms of protection of the homeland, where an agreement between U.S.
Coast Guard and Navy forces has established Maritime Defense Zones for defense of
the United States' contiguous seas. Mine warfare and attack submarine forces will
certainly be involved in the rear battle, protecting territory and supply lines.
Deep operations in the AirLand Battle seek to disrupt the enemy's
operational tempo and delay follow-on forces from entering the battle. Areas of
interest and influence are described in terms of time more than in terms of geography.
The deep battle at sea will concern itself with the attacking of opposing naval forces
before they can brought to bear on U.S. naval forces and destroying naval supply lines
and depots. Carrying the Fight to the Enemy is operationally similar to Deep
Operations; the characteristics of high leverage targets* distances between the main
force and these targets, the processes used to engage these targets, and the weapons
systems used to prosecute the engagements are all similar. The comparison is
continued below of the methods and resources for conducting deep battle and over-the-
horizon missions. [Ref. 50: pp. 12-14]
2. Methods and Resources
a. Methods
Figure 3.11 [Ref. 51: p. 25] shows the elements of a basic Command and
Control (C2) process model. These elements will be used to compare the processes of
J-SAK targeting and ASUW/STRIKE engagements. The purpose of comparing the
targeting and engagement processes with the generic C2 process is to highlight the













— to higher authority.
Figure 3.11 Command and Control (C2) Model.
The SENSE function corresponds to all data-gathering activities. It is
concerned with extracting signals from the environment. The PROCESS function acts
upon these signals to attempt to extract meaning from them. External data not
directly from the environment may be used. These may include intelligence analyses
indicating patterns representative of division headquarters, etc. The PROCESS
function produces event reports and status reports for use by later functions. The
COMPARE function compares the state of the environment, as determined by reports
from the process function, with a desired state as specified by some external source.
Based upon this comparison, the DECIDE function determines what should be done to
move the actual state to the desired state and the ACT function executes that decision.
[Ref. 51: pp. 23-46]
Figure 3.12 shows the side-by-side comparison of the C2, J-SAK targeting,
and ASUW, STRIKE engagement processes. All functions appear in their original
order. However, since the functions do not appear in the C2 process order,
underscored functions are placed besides their corresponding C2 function in the
diagram. Similar functions performed by different services at different locations could
be combined, if it was considered desirable or necessary. Even though there is not a
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one for one match to each other, ail functions have been included and represent an
opportunity for joint cooperation at each level. The "feedback." loop of Figure 3.11
would represent the assessment process after an engagement to determine the need for
further action. The comparison with a generic C2 model demonstrates the similarities
and that no important function has been overlooked in these processes.




















Move to Create Engagement
Opportunities
DECIDE Decision Move to Create Engagement
Opportunities
Reassess and Give Orders
to Attack or Abort
ACT Execution Execute Engagement
Figure 3.12 Comparison of C2 Model and the Engagement Processes.
b. Resources
As explained previously, the emphasis on resources was on laser systems
and munitions. Figures 3.6 and 3.10 were extracted from a joint publication on laser
designation of targets. Obviously, there are other resources available for the
prosecution of deep targets. The opportunities for joint cooperation appear to the
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author to lie primarily in prosecuting land-based deep targets with TACAIR resources
of all four services. Transitioning to the last chapter, CBRS requires some foundation
on which to derive military requirements. The joint doctrine on laser designation
establishes this foundation. The resources used to engage deep and OTH targets were
purposely displayed to highlight the similarities. This provides a vehicle for discussion
in the final chapter of a space-based laser designator.
F. SUMMARY
This chapter contains the materiel used to establish a general and specific context in
which space system support will be examined in the next chapter. The 1986 AirLand
Battle doctrine provides the general context for the Army and Air Force interplay in
performing missions; the 1986 supplement to the U.S. Naval Institute's Proceedings
provides the general context for Navy and Marine Corps interplay in performing
missions. Within these general contexts, the methods and resources used to perform
the Joint Attack of the Second Echelon (J-SAK) and attack of land based targets at
Over-the-Horizon (OTH) ranges are explored. After reviewing J-SAK and OTH, a
comparison of the AirLand Battle and Maritime Strategy showed that:
• The AirLand Battle and Maritime Strategy objectives are to achieve the stated
policy objectives issued by civilian political leaders of the country.
• The doctrines are compatible at the operational level of war.
• The fundamental principles of AirLand Battle appear as four tenets and are
reiterated or reinforced in different forms throughout the Maritime Strategy.
• - Activities in one services' area of operations may be included in another
services' area of operations. Opportunities for joint cooperation appear to lie in
prosecuting land-based deep targets with TACAIR resources of all four services.
With the ground work now established, the four CBRS areas of mission, historical
perspective, threat, and technological forecast will be used to provide an analysis of a
space-based laser designator.
6£




A Command and Control View of the Laser Designator Function
Laser designators act as an interface device. Recall from Chapter III the
generic Command and Control (C2) model (Figure 3.11). A human being (a spotter)
or electronic sensor sees a target (SENSE) and relays the grid coordinates of the target
to an organization whose has the responsibility to PROCESS, COMPARE, and
DECIDE what should be done. If an attack aircraft with laser guided munitions is
selected to engage the target (ACT), a spotter acts as the final controller of the
engagement because he designates the target with laser energy. The image the spotter
observes is translated into laser energy which the laser guided munitions sense. The
designators acts as an interface device between the SENSE and ACT functions.
It is important to interface the detecting sensor with the engaging munition.
If the target is detected by an emission of signals (through Communications
Intelligence-COiMINT or Electronics Intelligence-ELINT), and if the attacking
weapon is a missile which seeks that kind of emission (a High-Speed Ami- Radiation
Missile-HARM), then the engagement is compatible. If the target is spotted by a
person or through Imagery Intelligence (IMINT), then the engagement weapon must
either lock onto that image (which requires the spotter to continuously sight on the
target) or be translated into a form that the weapon platform and weapon can use to
engage the target (grid coordinates or laser designated energy).
2. Why a Space-Based Laser Designator
As stated in Chapter II, even when specific deficiencies do not exist,
technological opportunities should be explored that may enhance a mission area. It is
possible that the research being done on lasers for the Strategic Defense Initiative
(SDI) could provide a technological opportunity that would benefit the terrestrial use
of laser guided munitions. The example chosen to illustrate the CBRS process is a
space-based laser designator. Some of the other reasons for this selection are listed
below:
• Prior studies of space-based laser designators have not been found. No ongoing
work is being conducted or has been proposed for this idea. It therefore allows
an unclassified discussion without violating any security classifications.
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• The space mission which would be performed by a space-based laser designator
is a force application mission. Since the audience for this paper might not be
aware of the military space missions, this example gives an opportunity to
discuss them.
• Joint doctrine does exist on joint laser designation of targets. The example
provides a vehicle to discuss the four areas of mission, threat, historical
perspective, and technological forecasts and have a joint, doctrinal base on
which to show the relationship between mission requirements and space
limitations.
• Not all space systems have the treaty implications that a space-based laser
designator would generate. This provides a vehicle to examine the political and
pragmatic dilemma of conforming to treaty specifications while meeting the
needs of national security.
• It has been speculated that the ultimate goal of SDI is to attack ground targets.
This will examine one aspect of that argument.
• Work has been and is being done on space lasers. Information is available to
discuss the technological considerations of this idea as part of the CBRS
process.
3. Organization of this Chapter
The four areas that will be examined are highlighted in Figure 4.1. The
purpose of this examination is to demonstrate the CBRS process on a space-related
example. In the interest of brevity, it is not intended as an in-depth review or a
comparison of alternate methods of performing the same mission with different,
terrestrial assets. By considering the mission, historical perspective, threat, and
technological aspects of a space-based laser, the limitations imposed on any space
application will hopefully be surfaced. Space systems should be considered when the
systems can meet mission requirements for a combination of lower cost or higher
performance than can other systems. By following the CBRS process, these limitations

























Figure 4.1 CBRS Areas to be Covered in this Chapter.
B. MISSION
1. Military Space Missions
Military space missions are broken into categories as shown in Figure 4.2
[Ref. 52]. Space operations are performed to accomplish space missions. Space
operations is a broad generic term descriptive of a wide range of actions and activities
performed by space systems to accomplish military objectives. Space operations are
associated with:
• Preparation for launch.
• Launching, on-orbit operations and support.
• Satellite surveillance and warning, controlling spacecraft, and recovering earth-
orbital and extra-earth-orbital vehicles.
• Terrestrial activities that command, control, support, sustain, and surveil
spacecraft between launch and mission termination.
A description of the basic space missions accomplished by space operations follows.
a. Force Enhancement
By far the largest number of current military space missions are performed


















Figure 4.2 Military Space Roles and Missions.
area involving the use of space systems to improve the effectiveness of military forces.
Below are listed some of these support functions with an example (if available):
Communications. MILSTAR-advanced communications satellite.
Navigation. GPS-Global Positioning Svstem.
Terrestrial Surveillance. DSP-Defense Support Program.
Terrestrial Targeting.
Space Surveillance. SPADATS-Space Detection and Tracking System.
Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy. LANDSAT- Land-use satellite.
Environmental. DMSP-Defense Meteorological Satellite Program.
Search and Rescue. SARSAT-Search and Rescue satellite. [Refs. 52,53: n.p.,
pp. 33-39)
b. Space Support
Space support is combat-support mission area involving all necessary
prelaunch preparations and activities involved with deploying and sustaining space
systems. It includes such functions as:
• Space Launch and Recovery. The preparation, buildup, launch, deployment
and (if necessary) retrieval of space systems as well as the space transporter.
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• Orbit Transfer. Operations involving the use of propulsive stages to maneuver
satellites from their initial orbit to their fmal mission orbit.
• On-orbit Control. Operations to plan, train, direct, and sustain deployed
military space systems.
• Management, planning, and operations support activities. These include
manpower, training, safety, education, and logistics support. [Ref. 52]
c. Space Control
Space control is a combat mission area providing freedom of action in
space for friendly forces while denying it to the enemy. It embodies the concept of
"space superiority" and consists of two parts:
• Counter Space Operations. These are spacebome or terrestrial operations
conducted to gain or maintain control of and dominance over the space
medium. Included are measures to ensure that friendly space forces have
freedom of action through the space medium. This is carried out by nullifying
the enemy's offensive and defensive space capabilities.
• Space Interdiction. This function is conducted against the enemy's space lines
of communication (Space systems used to support or participate in military
operations) which could be used to support operations against friendly forces.
[Ref. 52]
d. Force Application
Force application is a combat mission area conducted from space against
terrestrial (land, sea, air) targets with the objective of influencing a terrestrial conflict.
Force application missions from space could encompass strategic offense and defense,"
interdiction of enemy forces and close support. [Ref. 52]
The purpose of this discussion was to familiarize the reader with the
possible missions which could be performed by the military. A space-based laser
designator would appear to fall into the category of force application. To the author's
knowledge, no programs currently perform within the definition of force application;
laser designation from space would definitely fill this void.
2. Joint Doctrine on Laser Designation of Targets
One of the areas where definitive joint doctrine does exist is in the area of
laser guided munitions. Joint Laser Designation Procedures is a 525-series pamphlet
which provides the joint tactics, techniques, and procedures for employing laser
designators with acquisition devices and laser guided munitions. It was written to be
used by the US Air Force Tactical Air Command (TAC), US Army Training and
Doctrine Command (TRADOC), US Atlantic Fleet (LANTFLT), and Marine Corps
Development and Education Command (MCDEC) to teach joint laser procedures. It
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may also be used by joint and service component forces to conduct joint laser training
and operations. It was written to be applicable to U.S. Readiness Command
(REDCOM) forces during training, exercises, and contingency operations.
[Ref. 44: pp. i-ii]
Recall from Chapter III that the primary means to attack deep targets for the
corps is through the use of attack aircraft. The STRIKE mission of the Navy and
Marine Corps use fighter aircraft to attack land-based or sea-based targets at over-the-
horizon ranges. The laser systems and munitions that can be used for these missions
were shown in Figures 3.6 and 3.10 and were extracted from this pamphlet.
Four requirements exist for using the laser target designator resources of the
services against deep or over-the-horizon targets. These requirements are shown in
Figure 4.3.
The pulse repetition frequency (PRF) code of the laser designator and the
Laser Spot Tracker (LST) or Laser Guided Weapon (LGW) must be the
same.
An agreed upon direction of attack is necessary, because the LST or
LGW must be able to "sense" sufficient laser energy reflected from the
target being designated.
The laser designator must be designating the target at the correct time.
The delivery system must release the weapon within the specific weapon's
delivery envelope.
Figure 4.3 Requirements for Using Laser Systems.
Laser designators emit a very narrow beam of infrared (IR) energy. Although
IR energy cannot be seen with the naked eye, its energy beam and spot are similar to
that of a narrow pencil-like beam of light. Laser seekers look for laser designator
energy on a specific pulse repetition frequency (PRF) code. Designators and seekers
must work together as a team on a specific code, so that seekers will not detect or
interfere with designators set on other codes. The designator and seeker pulse codes
use a truncated decimal system of three and four digit codes which correspond to
specific PRFs. The lower the code number, the faster the laser pulse rate. The faster
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pulse rates give the seeker the most opportunity to acquire the target in the time it is
available, but requires more power. The requirement to operate on different PRFs
would require a space-based laser to have the capability of switching PRFs and the
power to sustain the lower code/higher frequency pulses. [Ref. 44: pp. 51-54]
The other three requirements impose limitations on a space-based laser
designator's orbit. Figure 4.4 illustrates the engagement fan possible for a satellite
passing over a target. The target must be in the laser s field of view and oriented such
that an attacking system would receive the laser's reflected energy. The orbital
parameters"would tend to dictate the times that engagements could be conducted and
when the laser would be turned on. The platforms which carry the munitions (listed in
Figures 3.6 and 3.10) would have to know the direction of satellite passage and the
approximate position of the target to release the munitions within the weapon's
delivery envelope.
TARGET
Figure 4.4 Geometry of Engagement.
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C. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
1. Space Related Treaties
Any discussion of space systems must include a discussion of the treaties
which impose restrictions on the use of space systems. Figure 4.5 [Ref. 54: pp.
132-134] presents the pertinent treaties and limitations which could limit the
deployment of a laser designator in space.
1967 Outer Space Treaty
"~
1. Outer space, including moon and other celestial bodies, are free for
exploration and use by all states without discrimination.
2. Outer space and celestial bodies are not subject to national
appropriation by claim of sovereignty, use or occupation, or other
means.
3. Space activities shall be conducted in accordance with international
law, including UN charter.
4. Moon and other celestial bodies are to be used exclusively for peaceful
purposes.
5. Prohibited activities:
a. Nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (e.g.,
chemical, biological) not to be:
• Orbited around earth.
• Installed on celestial bodies.
• Stationed in outer space in any other manner.
b. On celestial bodies, it is forbidden to:
• Establish military bases, installation, and fortifications.
• Test any type of weapon.
• Conduct military maneuvers.
6. Use of military personnel for scientific research or other peaceful
purpose is permitted.
7. Requires international consultations before proceeding with activities
which would cause potentially harmful interference with activities of
other parties.
Figure 4.5 Summary of Space Treaties.
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1968 Agreement on Rescue of Astronauts and Return of Space Objects
1. Provides for rescue and return of astronauts who land in territory of a
party or a non-national area.
2. Provides for return to launching state of space objects which are found
outside its territory. Launching state required to provide identifying
data and take steps under direction and control of finding party to
eliminate range of harm from hazardous or deleterious space objects.
1971 Agreement with USSR on Measures to Reduce Risk of Nuclear War
• Obligates each party to notify other party of detection by missile
systems of unidentified objects or signs of interference with missile
warning systems or related communications facilities, if such
occurrences create risk of nuclear war.
1972 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space
Objects
1. Launching state absolutely liable for damage on earth or to aircraft in
flight caused by its space object.
2. Liability for damage caused by a space object to another space object
or to persons or property on board such a space object, anywhere
except on surface of earth, is determined by fault.
1972 ABM Treaty with USSR
1. Prohibits deployment of ABiM systems or components except as
specifically authorized in the treaty.
2. Prohibits development, testing, or deployment of space-based ABM
systems or components (prohibition does not apply to research and
development of space-based ABM systems preceding field testing).
3. Prohibits giving non-ABM missiles, launchers, or radars capabilities to
counter strategic ballistic missiles or elements in flight trajectory and
testing in ABM mode.
4. Prohibits deployment in future of radars for early warning of strategic
ballistic missile attack except along periphery of national territory and
oriented outward.
5. Prohibits interference with national technical means of verification
operating consistent with generally recognized principles of
international law.
Figure 4.5 . (cont'd.)
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6. Prohibits deliberate concealment measures which impede verification
by national technical means of compliance with the treaty.
1975 Registration of Space Objects Convention
1. Requires a party to maintain a registry of objects it launches into
Earth orbit or beyond.
2. Information on each registered object must be furnished to UN as
soon as practicable, including basic orbital parameters and general
function of the space object.
1980 Environmental Modification Convention
• Prohibits military or other hostile use of environmental modification
techniques as means of destruction, damage, or injury to any other
State Party if such use has widespread, long-lasting or severe effects.
Figure 4.5 . (cont'd.)
2. Space-Based Power
As can be seen in Figure 4.5, there are currently no treaty restrictions on the
use of nuclear power in space. The United States has typically used batteries, solar
cells and fuel cells as the primary sources of power for its spacecraft in earth orbit.
While the Soviets have used nuclear power for some high power requirements, the
United -States has resisted the use of nuclear power in space except for long range
probes which use radioactive isotopes for power. It is the author's opinion that this
trend will probably continue. Figure 4.6 [Ref. 55: Fig. IV.A-22] shows the electrical
power output and mission duration of various power supplies available for space
applications. Assuming that the historical trend continues and that the space-based
laser would have a mission duration in excess of a month, solar cells could provide up
to 5 kilowatts of power. This power would operate the laser and other subsystems of
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Figure 4.6 Power Supply Operating Regimes.
D. THREAT
As mentioned in the introduction of the thesis, the limitation of keeping the
document unclassified forces a somewhat imprecise discussion of the threat. The
following discussion of the enemy use of laser countermeasures was taken from Joint
Laser Designation Procedures [Ref. 44].
The Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies are the best equipped forces to
detect and counter the increasingly sophisticated laser designator and guidance
systems used by the armed forces of Western nations. The Soviets believe
precision guided munitions (PGMs), specifically advanced anti-tank guided
missile systems, are one of the most significant threats to their armored vehicle
inventory. Within the last 10 to 15 years, NATO, particularly the United States,
has become increasingly dependent upon PGMs to balance the growing
numerical superiority of Warsaw Pact conventional forces. A significant number
of these advanced weapons employ laser guidance and electro-optic sensors. The
Soviets have long recognized that effective laser countermeasures are readily
available and relatively inexpensive. Warsaw Pact open literature has made
continuing reference to the capability of natural and man-made obscurants to
significantly degrade laser systems and night vision devices. [Ref. 44: p. 4]
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The Soviets are known to be great users of battlefield obscurants to defeat the
weapons systems dependant on laser energy. The environmental restrictions on lasers
will be discussed in the next section. It is sufficient at this stage to acknowledge that
smoke, dust, and chemical particles in the air may attenuate or reflect the laser beam,
thereby preventing sufficient energy reflection from the target for lock-on by laser spot
trackers or laser guided weapons. When using obscurants, however, the obscurant is
usually placed in the line of sight between enemy forces and friendly forces; it is not
placed over the force which is using them. A space-based laser would force a use of
obscurants in a manner for which they were never designed to be used. [Ref. 44rp. 14]
While defeating the enemy's countermeasures of lasers, another threat is
encountered in space. The following excerpt was taken from a report on Anti-Satellite
Weapons, Countermeasures, and Arms Control performed by the Office of Technology
Assessment [Ref. 53].
The Soviet Union has been conducting a series of tests of coorbital satellite
interceptors ("killer satellites") since 1968. The Department of Defense estimates
that these anti-satellite weapons became operational in 1971. These weapons are
believed to be capable of attacking satellites at altitudes up to 5000 kilometers or
even higher, depending on their orbital inclinations, i.e., very different from the
latitude of the interceptor launch site. As of 1984 there appeared to be only two
launch pads for Soviet coorbital interceptors, both located at the Tyuratam
launch complex. Several interceptors could be launched per day from the
complex. [Ref. 53: p. 52]
As the limitations of lasers are examined in the next section, it will become apparent
that a space-based laser designator would be susceptible to this threat. [Ref. 53: pp.
49-91]
E. TECHNOLOGICAL FORECAST
The Concepts Based Requirements System recommends that even when a specific
deficiency does not exist in an area, technological opportunities for improving a
mission area should be explored. When the Army Space Initiatives Study (ASIS) was
conducted in 1985, the various proponents for the mission areas in Figure 2.1 were
given the task of determining what space technology could do for them in their
respective areas. Having worked in the area of Concepts and Studies within a Combat
Development Directorate, it appears to the author that the ASIS became a collection
of current MAA deficiencies with a best guess estimate of where space might help solve
the deficiencies. Some of the officers responsible for estimating the potential
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applications of space systems had as much space training as the author had prior to
attending this curriculum-little or none. Assuming that manning is approximately the
same as in 1984, the ASIS was competing for the project officers' time with other
assignments considered more important (Light Infantry Division actions, for example).
Therefore, the speculation may not have been as accurate as it could have been.
Space provides the advantages of covering great distances, assess to restricted
regions without violating sovereignty, and timeliness if enough satellites are deployed.
The purpose of this section is to examine what a space-based laser can and cannot do
if deployed. In this way, some of the limitations of space-based systems in "general
become apparent.
1. Environmental
The atmosphere contains a number of constituents which hamper the
transmission of a laser beam. Figure 4.7 [Ref. 56: p. 20] shows the transmission of
energy through the atmosphere in the various electromagnetic spectrum bands. Note
that transmission occurs in "windows" in the atmosphere. These windows permit a
laser beam to propagate from space to the ground. Another point to note is that
clouds severly attenuate laser beams in the visible and near infrared spectrum because
of their water content. The parts of the electromagnetic spectrum most often used for
self-contained guidance systems are reproduced from Precision Guided Weapons in
Figure 4.8 [Ref. 56: p. 18]. Since the wavelengths used for laser guided munitions are
normally in the near infrared and infrared regions, the laser beam does not penetrate
clouds; -it is essential then that the worldwide cloud coverage be considered to
determine when a laser designator from space can be used. Figure 4.9 [Ref. 55: Figure
II.B-7] shows the seasonal worldwide average daytime cloudiness. The Middle East
area appears to have an average of 0-50% sky cover for the entire year. Other areas of
interest, such as the Soviet Union and Europe, average greater that 50% cloud cover in
all seasons.
2. Power
Nothing stops the development of a program faster than a restriction that
prohibits the testing or could be interpreted to prohibit the employment of the system.
As stated in the historical perspective section, treaty restrictions do not limit the use of
nuclear power in space. In the case of a space-based laser, an interpretation could be
made that the use of nuclear power in a laser designator makes that designator a
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Figure 4.7 Atmospheric Transmission for the Electromagnetic Spectrum.
• Infrared: approx. 0.9 microns (0.9 x 10"6 meters), 3-5 microns, and 8-14
microns.
• Millimeter (10"3 meters) wave: around 8.6 mm (35 GHz), 3.2 mm (94
GHz), and 2.1mm (140 GHz)
• Other Microwave: 3 cm (10*2 meters) (10 GHz), 6 cm (5 GHz), and 10
cm (3 GHz).
Figure 4.8 Electromagnetic Spectrum for Self-Guided Munitions.
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Figure 4.9 Seasonal Worldwide Average Daytime Cloudiness.
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somewhat stretched interpretation and historical avoidance by the United States of
nuclear power in earth orbit would seem to restrict the total power of the laser
designator system to 5 kilowatts. This assumes a mission duration in excess of one
month and the use of solar cells (Figure 4.6).
3. Pointing Accuracy
In 1981, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
conducted a symposium on space laser power transmission. At the time of the
symposium, state-of-the-art aiming capabilities were estimated to be approaching the
precision required for point-to-point transmission for ranges comparable to ""Earth-
Moon distances. Skylab telescopes had a pointing accuracy of 4.9 microradians. 26
Current SDI objectives require a pointing accuracy of less than one microradian and
this has been NASA's goal in developing large space telescopes and for the
transmission of space laser power. Figure 4.10 [Ref. 57: p. 144] shows a NASA
assessment done in conjunction with the symposium which showed the status of space
laser applications and possible applications among civilian and military missions. The
figure shows that the intermediate and advanced technology needed for anti- satellite,
satellite defense, and destruction of ballistic boosters and airborne targets, can be
applied to a space laser system to destroy surface targets. A space-based laser
designator could reap the benefits gained in SDI of the pointing accuracy technology.
[Ref. 57: p. 19]
4. Spot Size
-
-The spot size for the standard target listed in Joint Laser Designation
Procedures is 2.3 meters by 2.3 meters [Ref. 44: Appendix A]. The wavelength of a
laser establishes some fundamental constraints on the optics that can be used with the
laser. By far the most important is the Fraunhofer diffraction limit, which determines
how small a spot the beam can form. In this case the spot size is measured as an angle
(as viewed from the laser) that is proportional to the ratio of wavelength to the
diameter of the focusing optics (mirrors). The theoretical formula for the ideal case is
shown in Equation 4.1.
1.22 x Wavelength(X)
Spot size (in radians) = (eqn 4.1)
Optics Diameter(D)
The formula can be altered to give spot size in meters as shown in Equation 4.2.












































Spot size (in meters) =
Figure 4.10 Synergisms Among Space Laser Applications.
1.22 x Wavelength(X.) x Target Distance(R)
Optics Diameter(D)
(eqn 4.2)
Figure 4.11 shows this situation for the standard target; Figure 4.12 shows the tradeoff*
between mirror diameters, altitude of the orbit, and the wavelength of the laser. The
curves are plotted for the wavelengths currently used in laser and precision guided
munitions listed in Figure 4.8. It is important to realize that the largest mirror in the
United States is the Mount Palomar Observatorv with a diameter of 5 meters, the
largest one in the world is 6 meters in the Soviet Union, and the largest one yet
designed and built for use in space is the 2.4 meter mirror for NASA's space telescope.
It would appear that the limitations of mirror diameters and the desire to use the
current PGM wavelengths would keep the orbital altitude of a space-based laser
designator below 2500 kilometers. Recall from the Threat section that this altitude is
within the threat window of the Soviet ASAT. [Ref. 5S: pp. 85-1 13]
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Figure 4.12 Altitude vs. Mirror Diameters for a Space-Based Laser.
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5. Timeliness
The orbital parameters determine the coverage and the times that coverage is
available. Atmospheric drag at low altitudes can limit mission duration. Figure 4.13
[Ref. 55: Fig. III.E-1] gives the maximum time of satellite coverage as a function of
orbital altitude; Figure 4.14 [Ref. 55: Table 1-1] gives the number of vehicles required
for worldwide coverage more often than hourly; the lower curve of Figure 4.15
[Ref. 55: Fig. 1=2] shows the limitations on orbital flight duration as a function of
orbital altitude. Because the laser system requirements call for an agreed upon
direction of attack, the time is effectively reduced by one half; the illustration in Figure
4.4 shows that after the satellite passes over the target, an engagement is no longer
possible if the weapons platform is not in the same quadrant as the satellite. When
considering the average cloud coverage in certain areas of the world, worldwide
coverage is probably not practical. Figure 4.14 gives an idea of the number of vehicles
required to provide worldwide timely coverage (more often than hourly). Depending
on funds and the cost of each space-based laser, this timeliness would probably
decrease. Recalling the times for J-SAK mission planning, a 96 hour planning horizon
and 36 hour apportionment decision would provide sufficient time to maneuver a
satellite into a position to influence the action. The satellite orbital parameters and
time of coverage of the target area would then dictate the exact window of time for
engagement. Synchronization would be accomplished by this fact since the attacking
platform would know the exact time the laser would be turned on, thus eliminating the
requirement for active communications. This may or may not be a desirable feature.
The purpose here is to highlight the tradeoff, not make the tradeoff ourselves.
F. SUMMARY
It was never intended for this chapter to be considered a complete analysis of a
space-based laser designator; therefore, the author cannot unequivocally conclude
whether the idea is "good" or "bad". The purpose here was to show the application of
the CBRS methodology to a space concept. By following the process, the analysis
highlights the advantages and disadvantages of the concept. Even though a space-
based laser designator would fill a void in the space mission of force application, would
not violate any treaties, would help counter the use of obscurants on the battlefield,
and has a sound doctrinal base, the biggest drawbacks are in the technological
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mirror requirements, and lack, of mission timeliness appear to be "show stoppers". The
area of technology, sometimes assumed to be the panacea given enough research and
money, became the drawback for this specific case. There are, of course, other cases
where the technology is developed and mature, but the areas of mission, historical
perspective, and threat do not support the application of the technology to the military
environment. All four areas provide a means to accomplish an ends: Highlight the
good and bad points of a potential space system before writing an operational concept
for its use. Since the operational concept drives the system specifications and materiel
acquisition process, it is important that the operational concept remain consistent
within the four areas. That way, engineers don't have to "paint a moving train"—
designing equipment while the operational concept and requirements are being
rewritten to make the space system work with other terrestrial systems.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
1. Conclusions From Chapter I
• Windows of opportunity sometimes open which will allow superior concepts the
chance of fruition; they also allow substandard concepts to be thrust forward
without adequate examination. It is essential that concepts be well-defined and
articulated before windows of opportunity open.
• It seems that the historical and political events of 1985 and 1986 may have
opened the window for consideration of space systems which are designed to
support joint tactical operations.
• The key to winning approval of Congressional funding for space systems in the
future will be the articulation of joint military requirements and showing the
relationship of these requirements to the accomplishment of unified missions
during the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting cycle.
2. Conclusions from Chapter II
• The field of military science requires guidelines—something upon which to base
its operations. Since the outcome of military operations is not deterministic, it
is hard to articulate a bedrock foundation on which to base employment and
acquisition decisions. It is, however, essential to attempt to articulate a
foundation for placing in context how a war will be fought, how missions will
be accomplished, and the interactions of the forces which will fight it. Doctrine
should provide this foundation.
• The Army's Concept Based Requirements System links doctrine to military
requirements, has been in use for over a decade, and has been recommended for
use by the other services.
• Even where specific deficiencies are not identified, technological opportunities
to strengthen mission areas should be explored.
• Terminology is important if one is to formulate and understand joint doctrine.
• The standardization of terminology is accomplished to some degree by JCS
Publication 1. JCS Pub 1 may omit terms used in the service and common
usage within the services may not coincide with definitions in JCS Pub 1.
3. Conclusions from Chapter III
• The services articulate fundamental principles that guide the employment of
forces in different ways. Since fundamental principles may be expressed as
capstone doctrine, basic doctrine, strategy, or white papers, it is important to
realize what one is reading, and more importantly, what one is searching for,
when interpreting and formulating future concepts in the joint and combined
areas.
92
• The AirLand Battle and the Maritime Strategy provide the general context for
joint service missions. The Joint Army and Air Force Attack of the Second
Echelon and the ASUW;STRIKE engagement process provide a specific
context for long range engagements. The AirLand Battle and Maritime
Strategy are compatible on what the Army calls the "operational" level of war.
The objectives, methods, and resources used to perform deep operations and
over-the-horizon operations invite opportunities for true, joint operations.
4. Conclusions from Chapter IV
• The idea of a Space-Based Laser Designator should not be construed to mean
that the concept is nearing development or realization. It was chosen solely as
a"rneans of illustrating CBRS's method of relating doctrine to requirements for
a space system.
• Joint doctrine does not exist in many areas where it is necessary. This lack of
doctrine does not allow the CBRS to adequately place in context how a new
space system will operate with current terrestrial systems. The example which
was chosen did have a doctrinal basis springing from the 525-series pamphlet
Joint Laser Designation Procedures.
• Concepts for new space systems must consider treaty implications if they are to
be realized in a timely manner.
• Space systems have several limitations when compared to terrestrial systems
when it comes to tactical warfighting. Some of these include responsiveness,
area of coverage, and priority of use.
• All things are not technologically feasible or desirable. An analysis should
provide a display of the advantages and disadvantages of space solutions. The
decision maker or makers with the responsibility of determining the
contribution expected of new systems can then decide if the idea is "good" or
"bad".
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
• The Concepts Based Requirements System (CBRS) should initially be adopted
by the J7 Doctrine and J8 Acquisition staffs as the integrating mechanism for
relating doctrine to acquisition. It will be a good starting place on which to
build.
Terminology should continue to be standardized. The AirLand Battle and
Maritime Strategy are semantically different, but substantially very similar. The
J7 should provide the momentum to insure future versions of the principles
outlined in both documents conform to the National Military Strategy.
The Space-Based Laser Designator should probably not be developed at this
time. Even though it would fill a void in the space mission of force application,
would not violate any space treaties, would help counter the use of obscurants
on the battlefield, and has a sound doctrinal base, the biggest drawbacks are in
the technological forecasts. The current pointing accuracy and environmental
limitations, spot size and mirror requirements, and lack of mission timeliness
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appear to be "show stoppers". The conditions under which one might wish to
reexamine this concept would include the ability of the SDI to meet
microradian pointing accuracy, a drastic reduction in the cost of mirrors, a
drastic reduction in launch costs, or a technological breakthrough which
allowed a laser beam to penetrate clouds.
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